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SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT 
GENDER AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
Elizabeth Rapaport* 
[TJhat Mrs. Spinelli's execution would be repul-
sive to the people of California; that no woman 
in her right mind could commit the crime 
charged to her; that the execution of a woman 
would hurt California in the eyes of the world; 
that both the law and the will of the people were 
against the execution; that Mrs. Spinelli, as the 
mother of three children, should have special 
consideration; that California's proud record of 
never having executed a woman should not be 
spoiled. l 
- Petition addressed to the Governor of Cal-
ifornia, as recalled by Clinton Duffy, Warden of 
San Quentin, to whom it was delivered in 1941, 
the year in which Eithel Spinelli was executed. 
Signed by thirty inmates, who also offered to 
draw straws to go to the gas chamber in Spinelli's 
stead if her sentence was not commuted. 
What is pertinent for distinguishing the sexes is 
the relationship to death. 
- Jean-Francois Lyotard2 
<0 1990 Elizabeth Rapaport. 
• Associate Professor of Public Policy, Duke University; J.D., 1987, Harvard Law 
School; Ph.D. Philosophy, 1971, Case Western Reserve University; B.A., 1965, City Col-
lege of New York. 
I would like to thank David Baldus and Philip Cook for their helpful comments, and 
Lissa Astilla, Eric Christopherson, Watt Espy, Alex Keyssar, Johannah Scherrer and 
Martha Wall for several kinds of much appreciated assistance in preparing this article 
for publication. 
1. C. DUFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN 135-36 (1962). 




Rapaport: Gender and the Death Penalty
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
502 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:501 
[Fjor if it comes it will be their doing, and they 
will have gained what I cannot but call a fatal 
victory, for they will have achieved it by bringing 
about, if they will forgive me for saying so, an 
enervation, an effeminacy, in the general mind of 
the country. For what else than effeminacy is it 
to be so much more shocked by the taking of a 
man's life than by depriving him of all that 
makes life desirable or valuable? Is death, then, 
the greatest of all earthly ills? Usque adeone 
mori miserum est? Is it, indeed, so dreadful a 
thing to die? Has it not been from of old one 
chief part of a manly education to make us de-
spise death - teaching us to account it, if an 
evil at all, by no means high in the list of evils; 
at all events, as an inevitable one, and to hold, as 
it were, our lives in our hands, ready to be given 
or risked at any moment, for a sufficiently wor-
thy object?3 
- Comment of John Stuart Mill in speech to 
Parliament on efforts of reformers to bring about 
a climate of opinion in which capital punishment 
for murder is unenforceable. 
I. ARE WOMEN SPARED? 
Throughout American history, executions of women have 
been rare events when compared to the volume of executions of 
men. The total number of persons executed from earliest colo-
nial times to the present is estimated to fall between 18,000 and 
20,000.· Four hundred of these were women. 1I The federal gov-
ernment began gathering national data on executions in 1930: It 
reports 3,963 executions from that date through 1988, of whom 
3. John Stuart Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment 1868, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 275 (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972). 
4. Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (H. 
Bedau 3d ed. 1982). 
5. V. STREIB, AMERICAN EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE OFFENDERS: A PRELIMINARY INVEN-
TORY OF NAMES, DATES AND OTHER INFORMATION (3d ed. 1988) (available from Professor 
Streib, Cleveland Marshall College of Law). See Streib, Death Penalty for Female Of-
fenders, 58 CINCINNATI L. REV. 845 (1990) on the history of the executions of females in 
the United States. 
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33 were women.6 Only one woman, North Carolina's Velma 
Barfield, grandmother and serial arsenic poisoner, has been exe-
cuted since 1976,7 the year in which the Supreme Court deci-
sively repudiated the abolitionist challenge to capital punish-
ment and inaugurated the modern death penalty era. Since that 
date, 128 men have suffered the same fate as Mrs. Barfield.s 
There are currently 2,347 death row inmates in the United 
States, of whom 30 are women.9 
The execution or capital sentencing of a woman is not 
merely a rare event; it is an anomalous one as welL There are 
deep cultural inhibitions against the deliberate killing of women, 
even women who have been convicted of heinous murders, which 
war with the criminal law norm of equality of treatment of all 
cases and the strictures of the fourteenth amendment's equal 
protection clause. No doubt for some death penalty supporters 
there is exhilaration and release in defying the inhibition. In 
their eyes, an evil woman deprives herself of the sanctuary of 
her sex by engaging in violent conduct forbidden to her, and be-
comes fair and intoxicating game.10 Others, like the San Quentin 
convicts who petitioned the governor to spare the life of Eithel 
Spinelli, react with revulsion to the prospect of the execution of 
6. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, 
at 9 (1989) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1986, at 9 (1987) [hereinafter CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1986) ("Appendix I: Women and the death penalty"). 
7. See generally State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979). 
8. NAACP. DEATH Row. U.S.A. 1 (May 30, 1990). 
9. [d. See also V. STREIB. IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCES UPON FEMALE OFFEND-
ERS. JULY 1. 1973. THROUGH JULY 15. 1989 (3d ed. 1989) (available from the author, Cleve-
land Marshall College of Law). 
10. James Reston, Jr., who covered the Barfield execution writes that "a clutch of 
death-penalty boosters" chanted" 'Hip, hip hurrah ... K-I-L-L.' 'Burn, bitch, burn.' " 
outside the Raleigh prison where the execution took place. "Their delerious cackles 
floated over the scene like a bad odor." Reston, I nuitation to a Poisoning, VANITY FAIR, 
Feb. 1985, at 82. 
[d. at 101. 
At 2 a.m. the cheerleaders, inspired by the collective sadism 
induced by the spectacle, began to chant "Kill her! Kill her!" 
and at 2:15 it was as if the home team had just scored the 
winning touchdown. They called out her name over and over, 
"Velma! Velma! Velma!" and spelled it out, "V-E-L-M-A." 
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a woman, seeing in it an inhumane and dishonorable perversion 
of the law.ll 
The rarity of women on death row and the cultural anoma-
lousness of executing women inevitably fuels speculation about 
whether female murderers receive favorable treatment in sen-
tencing. Prima facie, the grave disparity between the risk of exe-
cution faced by men and women suggests that American society 
is possessed of a chivalrous disinclination to sentence women to 
die. Such was the conclusion of Justice Marshall in Furman v. 
Georgia.12 Marshall ranges sex discrimination alongside race dis-
crimination and discrimination against the poor as among the 
reasons why the death penalty is offensive to contemporary 
American morality.13 
There is also overwhelming evidence that the 
death penalty is employed against men and not 
women. Only 32 women have been executed since 
1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate. It 
is difficult to understand why women have re-
ceived such favorable treatment since the. pur-
poses allegedly served by capital punishment 
seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes. 14 
The pattern Marshall stigmatized is essentially unchanged to-
day. One in eight persons arrested for murder is a woman, III but 
11. The New York Times reported that 300 San Quentin inmates offered to die in 
her stead the first time an execution date was set for Mrs. Spinelli. N.Y. Times, July 17, 
1941, at 20, col. 3. 
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Sellin reached the same conclusion in his study of the pre-
Furman death penalty system. See T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 66-68 (1980). 
13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). Furman held then extant 
death penalty statutes to be violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The 
position taken by Justice Marshall, that the death penalty is offensive to contemporary 
American morality and as such is cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the eighth 
amendment, was adopted only by himself and Justice Brennan. Justices Brennan and 
Marshall remain the only adherents on th~ Court of the position that the death penalty 
is per se cruel and unusual punishment. The Court's five member Furman majority 
could agree only that existing death penalty statutes permitted unconstitutionally arbi-
trary and capricious selection for death. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and 
two companion cases, the Court reinstated the death sentence. It sanctioned several state 
death penalty statutes designed to remedy the vices of earlier statutes criticized in 
Furman. 
14. Furman, 408 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring), 
15. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 46 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND 
JUSTICE), reporting FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data. 
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only one death row inmate in a hundred is a woman. IS Male 
murderers are twenty times more likely to be death sentenced 
than female murderers. 17 
Despite the apparent disparity of treatment, the prima facie 
case for glaring gender discrimination in the application of capi-
tal punishment dissolves when subjected to fuller examination. 
Before considering the case for disparity, it is worth pausing to 
note that, since Furman, a set of counterbalancing developments 
in constitutional law has rendered gender discrimination in capi-
tal sentencing both more constitutionally problematic and, ironi-
cally, virtually impervious to constitutional challenge. 
In 1976, in Craig v. Baren,18 the Court announced that for 
purposes of equal protection analysis, government classification 
by gender would have to withstand intermediate level scrutiny; 
i.e., gender classifications must serve important government 
objectives and the means employed to achieve those objectives 
must be substantially related to them. In 1982, in Mississippi 
University far Wamen v. Hagan,19 the Court held that the same 
standard of review was to· apply whether men or women were 
disadvantaged by government action. Although gender has not 
been elevated to the same level as race, i.e., that of a suspect 
classification subject to strict scrutiny analysis,20 intermediate 
level scrutiny should be sufficient to invalidate any statutory 
sentencing scheme which explicitly discriminated in favor of ei-
ther sex. In MUW, as in Craig, the Court insists that it will look 
with extreme disfavor on gender stereotyping and the assump-
tion that gender could be used as a "proxy for other, more ger-
mane bases of classification."21 
Even before the MUW decision, as early as 1968, courts 
were deploying equal protection analysis to invalidate disparate 
16. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, supra note 6, at 6. 
17. In 1986, two percent of males convicted of murder in state courts were death 
sentenced; one tenth of one percent of female murderers were death sentenced. BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF FELONS CONVICTED IN STATE 
COURTS, 1986, at 9 (Jan. 1990). 
18. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
19. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) [hereinafter referred to in text as MUW]. 
20. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
21. MUW, 458 U.S. at 726 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 198). 
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sentencing schemes that subjected female offenders to longer pe-
riods of incarceration than similarly situated male defendants.22 
These courts rejected the nineteenth century ideology which 
held that women, more tractable and educable than men, could 
derive greater benefit from the rehabilitative influences of a 
prison regime. After MUW, if the Court continues in the course 
it has set, it is unlikely that any statutory invocation of gender 
differences as legitimate determinants of sentencing could with-
stand equal protection review. Consider, as examples, two char- . 
acteristics which are more frequently found among women than 
men offenders that could be plausible bases of government poli-
cies of leniency for women - having responsibility for children, 
who will suffer during their incarceration, and having relatively 
few prior convictions. In the light of Craig and MUW, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that reviewing courts would permit the proxy use 
of female gender for carrying parental responsibility or relative 
lack of criminal history. Such proxy use would be an invidious 
method of serving government objectives, since not all female 
offenders are responsible parents or criminal neophytes, and 
some male offenders are parents or have slight criminal records. 
No capital punishment statute classifies by gender, but it is 
arguable that gender bias infects the administration of capital 
punishment because the discretion of prosecutors, juries and 
judges is employed to the advantage of female murderers. Prior 
to Furman, capital punishment statutes typically gave sentenc-
ing authorities untrammelled discretion to mete out life o.r 
death. Although sentencing discretion has been substantially re-
duced in the modern death penalty regime, it remains arguable 
post-Furman that the sparseness of women on death row testi-
fies to the discriminatory use of capital sentencing discretion. 
However, in light of the recent decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,23 
22. Note, Sentencing Women: Equal Protection in the Context of Discretionary 
Decisionmaking, 6 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 85 (1979-80), discusses these cases: Robinson v. 
York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 
400 (1968); and State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973). The Note also dis-
cusses the unwillingness of courts to grant women relief from discriminatory sentencing 
practices for some 150 years before the late 1960s. 
23. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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in which the Supreme Court finally took up the question of ra-
cial discrimination in the application of the death penalty, it ap-
pears that even in the face of convincing evidence of gender dis-
parity, male offenders could not expect to successfully challenge 
the death penalty on the grounds that males are disproportion-
ately selected for death. 
McCleskey, a death sentenced black, argued that he could 
demonstrate statistically that blacks, and especially blacks who 
killed whites, are more likely to receive death sentences. The 
Court brushed aside his fourteenth amendment claim on the 
grounds that to prevail under the equal protection clause 
McCleskey would have to prove that he was the victim of pur-
poseful discrimination.24 The Court was more troubled by the 
related eighth amendment claim that the Georgia capital pun-
ishment system allows arbitrary and capricious sentencing, i.e., 
that sentencing discretion masks racist selection for death. Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Powell surveyed twenty years of Su-
preme Court cases which have the effect of narrowing the class 
of murders and of murderers that may be subject to the death 
penalty while protecting wide discretion to decline to impose a 
death penalty. He concluded that much abusable discretion has 
been wrung from the system while preserving the traditional lat-
itude of the sentencer to be responsive to individualized mitigat-
ing circumstances and to show mercy. No system can be ex-
pected to achieve perfection, i.e., to be incapable of racist abuse. 
Having surveyed the work of the Court, he finds that what has 
been done suffices.211 
Powell then acknowledged that he had further concerns 
which buttress the decision to deny McCleskey relief. If imper-
missible racism were acknowledged to invalidate capital sentenc-
ing, the door would be opened for similar complaints about 
lesser penalties, and the whole fabric of the criminal justice sys-
tem would be subject to attack. Other unexplained discrepancies 
in sentencing would also become the bases for claims for sen-
tencing relief: "[T]he claim that [McCleskey'S] sentence rests on 
the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to 
24. Id. at 292-99. 
25. Id. at 299-306. 
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claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to 
membership in other minority groups, and even to gender."26 
Thus we find that statistically-based challenges to gender 
discrimination in capital sentencing are doubly barred by 
McCleskey. No defendant may prevail who cannot show that his 
case was marred by purposeful discrimination. This of course is 
a virtually impossible task. Additionally, Justice Powell unfurls 
a reductio ad absurdem argument: if statistical evidence were 
permitted to make out a case for racial bias in capital sentenc-
ing, the courts could be asked to hear claims {"even"} of gender 
discrimination. Justice Powell does not stop to explain wherein 
the absurdity lies. 
Although gender discrimination in the application of capital 
punishment is an unlikely candidate for litigation, the wide-
spread impression, or suspicion, that women receive favorable 
treatment with respect to society's most severe penalty reverber-
ates. It echoes the widely accepted chivalry thesis, that women 
receive preferential treatment in the criminal justice system.27 
The death penalty, as society's most awesome sanction, symbol-
izes the power of society to exact justice for the violation of 
rights it chooses to protect. The impression that women are 
spared death, despite our gathering commitment to sexual 
equality, is indicative of the conviction, deep in the culture, that 
women will continue to lack full moral, political and legal stat-
ure, and that they gain certain protections in exchange for ac-
cepting these limitations.28 Ripples of corrosive sexism flow from 
26. Id. at 315-17 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
27. Nagel and Hagan write that "[a) review of the post-1975 literature suggests that 
the chivalry hypothesis is now wholly accepted." See Nagel & Hagan, Gender and Crime: 
Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE, AN ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 113 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1983). 
28. I make this claim only and specifically about American society. It is possible 
that in other societies, with their different histories, the exemption of women from the 
death penalty could bear a different meaning; it could, for example, amount to dawning 
recognition of the unjust burdens borne by women in the past. Possibly something of 
this kind is intended by the exemption of women from the death penalty in the proposed 
new criminal code of the Soviet Union. That women share the exemption with males 
under 18 and over 60 does suggest, however, that the Soviets are engaging in a progres-
siv~ effort to limit the reach of capital punishment by exempting those perceived to be 
too weak to bear the full weight of societal retribution. See Fletcher, In Gorbacheu's 
Courts, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 18. 1989, at 16. The history of the feminist movement in 
the United States, which has always pressed for civil and political equality, renders it 
8
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the perception that female murderers are shielded from the soci-
ety's most extreme punitive response. Interestingly, the informa-
tion presently available does not support the proposition that 
female murderers have a substantial advantage over similarly 
situated male murderers in avoiding the death penalty. The lim-
ited information available suggests that women may be reaping 
both the rigors of equality and the detriments of the widespread 
suspicion of privilege. 
Available evidence does not support the proposition that 
the American prosecutors, juries and courts refuse, out of chiv-
alry, to death sentence women in circumstances where a capital 
sentence would be the fate of male offenders, certainly not to 
the egregious extent that Justice Marshall's complaint suggests: 
The fundamental reason why so few women murderers are death 
sentenced is that women rarely commit th~ kinds of murders 
that are subject to capital punishment. Women commit one of 
every eight murders,29 but are far more likely to commit certain 
types of murders than others. Most offenders on death row, as 
many as eighty percent, have been convicted of felony murder, 
i.e., murder in the course of committing another felony.3o 
Women commit very few felony murders. Six percent of sus-
pected perpetrators of felony murder are female. 31 Women do 
hold their own, however, in the commission of intra-family 
homicide. They kill spouses and children almost as often as men 
impossible to interpret exemption from ultimate criminal liability as anything but ex-
plicit or tacit recognition of the undesirability of the full attainment of the expressed 
goal. 
29. Twelve percent of persons arrested for murder or nonnegligent manslaughter in 
1988 were female. REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 15.· 
30. Gross and Mauro found that over 80% of the death sentences in Florida and 
Georgia and 75% in Illinois in a five year period, 1976-80, were in cases that involved 
other felonies. See S. GROSS & R. MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION 45 (1989). 
31. FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS [hereinafter SHR] data for the twelve 
year period 1976-87 report that there were in total 20,905 suspects known to the police 
for the particular felony murders of rape, burglary, robbery, larceny, auto theft and ar-
son, and the catch-all category of other felony murders. Females accounted for 1,292 of 
these suspects. Men therefore were suspected of felony murder of one of these kinds 
sixteen times as often as women. SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS are compiled by the 
Uniform Crime Reporting section of the FBI based on reports from law enforcement 
agencies. I am grateful to James Alan Fox of Northeastern University's National Crime 
Analysis Program for supplying me with the FBI supplemental homicide data used in 
this article. 
9
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do.32 Intra-family homicides rarely give rise to capital sentences, 
regardless of the sex of the defendant, unless the murder was 
committed for gain. These homicides are typically read as less 
blameworthy than those that merit the death penalty, lacking 
either or both of the qualities of coldbloodedness or predatori-
ness. Indeed, only the most aggravated murders can sustain a 
death sentence under modern era capital punishment law.33 
Those who have interpreted the extreme gender lop-
sidedness of the death row population to reflect chivalry towards 
women murderers have failed to take into consideration the 
greater seriousness or heinousness ascribed by our criminal law 
to felony murder, and to predatory murders generally, as com-
pared with typical family and other intimacy murders which are 
committed in the heat of anger. Consider robbery murder, by far 
the largest subclass of felony murders. Over the twelve year pe-
riod, 1976-87, men were twenty-five times more likely to be rob-
bery murder suspects than were women.34 Male murder defend-
ants are more likely than female murder defendants to be 
capitally tried and sentenced in part for the legitimate, legally 
relevant reason that they are more likely to have prior histories 
of and convictions for violent crimes. More than ninety-five per-
cent of those convicted of violent crimes are male.35 There are 
other indications, although by no means conclusive proofs, that 
women are not grossly advantaged in selection for death. Two 
sets of researchers who have studied post-Furman death sen-
tencing report that gender had no significant effect on the fate 
32. In the 12 year period, 1976-87, 11,690 women and 16,793 men were suspected of 
killing spouses, lovers and ex-spouses. Two thousand five hundred and twenty four 
mothers and 3,265 fathers were suspected of killing their children. Unfortunately, the 
SHR data does not distinguish between minor and adult victims of parental homicide. 
See SHR, supra note 31. 
33. In the five year period 1976-80, there were 96,170 homicide arrests but only 
1,011 death sentences meted out, a ratio of 100 to 1. S. GROSS & R. MAURO, supra note 
30, at 3. Nakell and Hardy studied homicides in North Carolina, a mid-sized death pen-
alty state, for a year period, 1977-78. See B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY (1987). They found that most judicial districts brought between 5 
and 15% of their murder cases to trial on a first degree murder charge. [d. at 152. Of the 
611 arrests in the study, 331 cases were indicted for first degree murder, 60 cases went to 
trial on that charge, 18 resulted in first degree murder verdicts and 8 were death sen-
tenced. [d. at 93, 130. 
34. According to SHR data, 13,528 men and 565 women were suspected of robbery 
murder during this 12 year period. See SHR, supra note 31. 
35. In 1983, 95% of state prison inmates and 96% of federal inmates were male. 
REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 41. 
10
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of persons convicted of murder.ss These studies were conducted 
to investigate the impact of race on capital sentencing; because 
the number of women whose cases had the potential for aggra-
vated first degree murder processing is small, it would be impru-
dent to overgeneralize from these results. Further research is 
necessary to determine whether prejudice in favor of women 
murderers plays any role in accounting for the rareness of 
women on death row. 
Given the lack of information about women aggravated 
murderers, we might be tempted to turn for enlightenment to 
research about gender bias in the sentencing of offenders con-
victed of serious violent crime other than aggravated murder, 
with the expectation that the results would be applicable to cap-
ital punishment as well. Such a foray into criminological re-
search is more productive of research hypotheses than of reliable 
answers to questions about capital punishment. One reason for 
great caution in extrapolating from sentences for other kinds of 
serious crime to sentences for aggravated murder is that in the 
at least somewhat analogous area of racial bias, the extrapola-
tion is not supported by research findings. The most authorita-
tive research does not find that blacks are more harshly sen-
tenced than whites for crimes less severe than aggravated 
murder.s7 But in the arena of capital punishment, there is a sub-
stantial body of research that reveals that killers of white vic-
tims are more likely to be sentenced to die than killers of black 
36. B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, supra note 33, at 139-48, concluded that the sex of the 
over 600 persons arrested for murder in North Carolina in a yearlong period 1977-78 had 
no significant effect upon the likelihood that they would be tried for first degree murder, 
be convicted of first degree murder or receive a life or death sentence. In their study of 
the operation of the death penalty in Georgia between 1979 and 1981, Baldus, Wood-
worth and Pulaski found that the sex of the defendant did not have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on sentencing outcomes, although there was a weak correlation between be-
ing female and a nondeath penalty result. Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring 
and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 
D.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1385 (1985) [hereinafter Baldus). Caution is necessary in ap-
proaching these results. Because the number of women in these studies is small, one 
cannot generalize from them with any confidence. The smallness of the subject popula-
tion hampers all research about crimes of violence by women. See Nagel & Hagan, supra 
note 27, at 109. 
37. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 
69 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry, eds. 1983) (discussing determinants 
of sentences). 
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victims, all other factors being equaJ.38 It may well be that 
whatever present and future research may reveal about less seri-
ous crimes, gender and the death penalty may interact to pro-
duce a different pattern of results. If prosecutors and juries react 
more punitively to the death of a white victim, so they may also 
exhibit some distinctive pattern of reaction that is triggered by 
the presence of a female offender and aggravated murder. 
Caution is also necessary in extrapolating from research 
about gender bias in sentencing for less serious crime because of 
lack of agreement among researchers. There is a consensus in 
criminological research that women benefit from leniency in 
some pre-sentencing phases of case processing and in sentencing 
for many relatively minor crimes.39 Researchers are divided as to 
whether women who commit serious or violent crime are more 
lightly sentenced than comparable male ofl'enders.4° While some 
believe that leniency carries through into sentencing for serious 
crime, other researchers believe women convicted of serious or 
violent crime lose the advantage of being female and are treated 
no differently or even more harshly than men. Wherever and to 
the extent that criminologists see an advantage to female gen-
der, they proffer the same explanatory hypothesis, the chivalry 
or paternalism hypothesis: women are treated as less responsible 
for their actions, hence less culpable, and perhaps also as posing 
less continuing danger to society. Researchers who find that 
women receive sentences as severe as comparable males hypoth-
esize that when a woman is perceived as guilty of a severe or 
"male" offense she loses the advantage of her gender and is more 
38. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990) (report to Senate and House Com-
mittees on the Judiciary); D. BALDUS, C. PULASKI & G. WOODWORTH, EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimi-
nation in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133 (1986); S. 
GROSS & R. MAURO, supra note 30. Gross and Mauro provide some interesting specula-
tion about why the death penalty is different from other sentences. See id. at 187. 
39. Nagel and Hagan reach this conclusion in their review of the literature. See 
supra note 27. Some researchers argue that females are more harshly sentenced than 
males for some minor offenses, e.g, juvenile women are reported to receive harsher treat-
ment for "status" offenses. See Zingraff & Thompson, Differential Sentencing of Women 
and Men in the U.S.A., 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 401, 403 (1984). 
40. Some researchers who acknowledge relative leniency in sentencing believe it is 
attributable to legally relevant variables, e.g., seriousness of offense or prior record. Zin-
graff and Thompson, supra note 39, at 402-03, survey the literature in which the contro-
versy between the legalistic and paternalistic positions is played out. 
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harshly punished because of her violation of gender stereotypical 
expectations. There is some tendency to conflate two distinct 
hypotheses, either one of which is confusingly termed the "evil 
woman" hypothesis. The first hypothesis, which would more ap-
propriately be called the "gender equality" theory, is that 
women who, perhaps contrary to gender norm expectations, 
commit high severity offenses, are treated no differently than 
men. The second, the true "evil woman" theory, is that women 
who commit high severity offenses are treated more harshly than 
similarly situated men: they are punished for violating sex role 
expectations in addition to being punished for their crimes. 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate the power of 
each of these three theories to account for the fates of female 
murderers. The next section of this essay does, however, take 
some first steps towards understanding the impact of gender on 
capital sentencing. I will review two sets of cases of death sen-
tenced women, the first comprising thirty women who were exe-
cuted between 1930 and 1967, and the second comprising a 
group of thirty-nine women, all those death sentenced in a ten 
year period 1978-87, after capital punishment was reinstated in 
1976. I will content myself with providing some tentative an-
swers to questions which may help point the way to more exact-
ing and large scale research: Who were/are these women? Who 
were/are their victims? Why, at least in the eyes of those who 
convicted and sentenced .them, did they kill? Are there indica-
tions that their sentencers took their sex to be salient in judging 
their crimes or their characters? How do their stories compare 
with what we know about death sentenced men? The analyses of 
these cases offer some limited support for the gender equality 
theory, and tend to disconfirm the evil woman theory, in that 
the stories of the condemned women resemble the stories of con-
demned men. I, at least, was somewhat surprised by these re-
sults because I shared something of the intuition of those femi-
nists who suspect that women killers, simply because they 
violate the gender tabu against violent aggression, might be sus-
ceptible to harsher treatment than men, whom we expect and 
sometimes oblige to use violence. 
Before turning to the cases of death sentenced women, it 
may be useful to clarify my orientation towards capital punish-
ment. I hold no brief for the American institution of capit~l 
13
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punishment. It has been ably and persuasively argued that the 
post-Furman death penalty system has not been cleansed of the 
flaws which the Supreme Court stigmatized in invalidating the 
prior law.41 The five member Furman majority held that the 
death penalty violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments 
because defendants were selected for death in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. Among the reasons which brought various of 
the majority justices to this conclusion, there are three that re-
main the most troubling criticisms of our death penalty system. 
1) The freakish rarity of death sentences: it remains implausible 
today that the two percent of convicted murderers who are sen-
tenced t? die are more reprehensible criminals than some of the 
murderers who have been life sentenced. The lack of horizontal 
equity is exacerbated by the history of America's death row in-
mates after condemnation. Of the more than 3,000 people con-
demned since 1977, only a few dozen have actually been exe-
cuted, more than one third have been removed from death row 
as the result of appellate court actions, and more than 2,000 re-
main on death row.42 
2) Class discrimination: The death sentence remains the meed of 
the poor. 
3) Race discrimination: Although earlier research on racial dis-
crimination against blacks has been challenged for failure to 
control for important variables - principally the seriousness of 
the offense and prior criminal record - more recent studies 
have found that the race of the victim is a highly salient varia-
ble.4s The death penalty is used to punish the murder of whites 
regardless of the race of their killers. In my view, the fact that 
we have clung to the death penalty despite these flaws more 
than suggests that its power lies in its symbolism. In the final 
section of this essay, I will explore one aspect of the symbolic 
content of the death penalty system which reveals a powerful 
kind of gender bias disadvantageous to women. 
41. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 
(1986), especially the last chapter. 
42. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, supra note 6, at 1, 8. 
43. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 88-110; S. GROSS & R. MAURO, 
supra note 30; Baldus, supra note 38. 
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II. WOMEN OF DEATH ROW 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, thirty-two 
women were executed in the United States between 1930, when 
the federal government began compiling death row statistics, 
and 1967, when a ten year moratorium on executions began~" I 
have been able to verify and obtain information about thirty."!! 
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, at least forty-
nine women have been admitted to America's death rows.'6 Be-
cause the number of cases is so small, it has been possible to 
collect and sift the stories of all the women who were executed 
between 1930 and 1967 and a large sample of the more recent 
group, thirty-nine women who were death sentenced in the ten 
year period 1978-87.47 There is at least one important difference 
between the two groups of women. The first group excludes, 
while the second does not, women whose sentences were subse-
quently reduced. Some of the second group of women have al-
ready had their sentences reduced and more undoubtedly will, 
since thus far in the history of the post-Furman death penalty 
regime, at least a third of all death penalty cases have been sub-
ject to sentence reduction because of subsequent appellate court 
action.'8 The two groups of cases differ, -therefore, in that the 
women in the first group are beyond the help of appellate courts 
and executive clemency.4s Clemency was much more frequently 
44. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1986, supra note 6, at 9. 
45. The federal government lists an execution in Louisiana in 1935 and one in Mis-
sissippi in 1943, id., that I have not been able to confirm from corrections officials, court 
records in these states, or nongovernmental sources. 
46. See V. STREIB, supra note 9. 
47. I have excluded from this case review women who were sentenced after 1987, 
about whom it is relatively difficult to obtain information. I begin the sample decade 
with the year 1978, the year in which Velma Barfield was sentenced. An additional 14 
women were sentenced in 1973-77, spanning a period which began when the future of the 
death penalty was uncertain in the wake of Furman and ended in the year of the first 
execution in a decade. Each of these 14 women has subsequently left death row alive. 
See V. STREIB, supra note 9. 
48. From 1977 through 1988, 1,249 of the 3,057 persons sentenced to die were re-
moved from death row by appellate court action, commutation or death from causes 
other than execution, i.e., old age, illness, suicide or murder. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
1988, supra note 6, at 8. 
49. In the pre-Furman death penalty system it was not uncommon for governors 
and pardon boards to grant clemency to half or more of those condemned, although the 
frequency of clemency differed, of course, from state to state and administration to ad-
ministration. Sellin reports that of the 295 persons sentenced to death in California, 
1950-67, 102 (34.6%) were executed. See T. SELLIN, supra note 12, at 67. See also Note, 
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136. 191 (1964) (authored by 
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granted under the pre-Furman regime than it is today; the cur-
rent law includes an elaborate appeals process in which it is pos-
sible to gain sentence reduction as well as reversal of convic-
tion.110 Sentence reduction on appeal has for the most part 
replaced executive clemency as the mode of reconsideration of 
jury sentences. In the post-Furman system any woman now on 
death row may yet get her sentence reduced. The two groups 
will be discussed separately in order to respect the difference in 
their compositions and to permit comparisons of the two eras.III 
A. WOMEN EXECUTED BETWEEN 1930 AND 1967 
Of the thirty women, the first two were executed in 1930, 
the last in 1962, by thirteen states and the federal government. 
Most death penalty states have never executed a woman. 
Twenty-one of the women' wer~ white and nine were black. With 
one exception, each of the women was executed for a fatal crime. 
Eight of the women executed - the largest single grouping 
were executed for murder in the course of armed robbery. 
Each one of these women was successfully portrayed as an ag-
gressive, self-willed killer, either acting alone, or, if acting in 
concert with another, being the dominant partner or at least 
fully the peer of her collaborator. None were mere helpmeets of 
crime; all were the active agents of the destruction of another for 
Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde, Comparison of the Exe-
cuted and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L. & POLICE SCI. 
301 (1962). In the pre-Furman system, howevef, those not granted clemency were exe-
cuted rather than maintained indefinitely on death row. On clemency post-Furman see 
Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process in Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 
YALE L.J. 889 (1981). The NAACP Legal Defense Fund reports that as of January 1990, 
52 persons have had their death sentences commuted since 1976. Personal communica-
tion with Karima Wicks, editor of NAACP, DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 8. 
50. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, TIME AND EXPENSE ANALYSIS IN POST-CONVICTION 
DEATH PENALTY CASES (Feb. 1987) (report prepared for the Senate and House Appropri-
ations Committees of the Florida Legislature and the Office of the Governor of Florida). 
51. Information about these cases was gathered for the most part from appellate 
reports where they were available and newspapers when cases were not appealed. Several 
of the women in the first group of cases died without being heard on appeal. Among the 
later group, several have not yet had their direct appeal, which can take several years in 
state court systems swamped by death sentence review cases. Gross and Mauro report 
that as of February I, 1988, 40% of death row inmates had not yet had their first appeal, 
S. GROSS & R. MAURO, supra note 30, at 220. I have also relied on other sources of infor-
mation, including trial transcripts, defense and prosecution briefs, and telephone com-
munication with prosecutors, public defenders, defense attorneys, and Watt Espy of the 
Capital Punishment Research Project in Headlands, Alabama. 
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gain. Several murdered while male accomplices stood by 
passively. 
Irene Schroeder (Pennsylvania, executed 1931, white, 
twenty-two years 01d)1I2 was executed for a Bonnie and Clyde 
style spree of armed robberies. At her trial she testified that she 
stole "just to get a thrill out of it."113 One such crime led to a 
chase by the highway patrol. She, Glenn Dague, with whom she 
was "living meretriciously,"114 and her brother, robbed a store, 
taking her small child with them in the car to aid escape. She 
and her companions got the drop on the highway patrol after 
they were stopped by the officers. Schroeder shot and killed a 
highway patrolman while he was standing with his hands in the 
air at her direction. The robbers fled, and were eventually ap-
prehended in Arizona after another confrontation with the law. 
Schroeder shot a sheriff in the second shoot-out, who also died. 
Mary Holmes (Mississippi, 1937, black, thirty-two) was a 
household cook; she and a male accomplice carefully planned 
the robbery of her employer's safe. When her employer unex-
pectedly interrupted their nocturnal intrusion, she and her com-
panion each hid, and waited for the right moment, whereupon 
her companion struck the householder with an iron pipe. The 
pair left, but returned several hours later to set the house afire 
with gasoline. They were dubbed "torch murderers" by the 
Sharkey County newspaper. The widow of the dead man refused 
to believe Holmes guilty until she confessed.1I11 
Rosanna Phillips (North Carolina, 1942, black, twenty-five) 
struck the first and fatal blow that killed her employer (the 
couple were apparently tenant farmers) so that she and her hus-
band could rob him. Her husband testified that the robbery and 
murder were Rosanna's idea and that he himself had struck the 
landlord only when and because Rosanna told him to do it. liS 
52. Hereinafter the state in which the offender was executed, the year of execution, 
her race, and her age at execution, if known, in that order, will be noted in parentheses 
for each offender. 
53. Commonwealth v. Schroeder, 302 Pa. I, 4, 152 A. 835, 838 (1930). 
54. Id. at 11, 152 A. at 836. 
55. The Deer Creek Pilot, Apr. 30, 1930, at 1. 
56. Durham Morning Herald, Oct. 14, 1942, at 1. 
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Bessie Mae Williams (North Carolina, 1944, white) repeat-
edly stabbed her cabby victim. A woman accomplice joined her 
in stabbing the cabby. One male accomplice stood by and an-
other held the cabby. The foursome were after money with 
which to have a good time.1I7 
Helen Fowler (New York, 1944, black, twenty-five), a prosti-
tute, along with a male confederate, severely beat and robbed a 
trick. The victim was "well into middle age, well along in 
years,"118 and drunk. Helen then dragged him into a back room, 
. where he was left dead or dying. The next night, upon r~turning 
from drinking and gambling with the victim's money, and find-
ing him dead, the accomplices threw the body in the river.1I9 
Corinne Sykes (Pennsylvania, 1946, black, twenty-two), act-
ing alone, stabbed and robbed her employer. She had been her 
maid.60 
Barbara Graham (California, 1955, white) used her un-
threatening feminine appearance to gain entrance to the home 
of an elderly woman invalid. Graham pistol' whipped and 
smothered her victim so that she and her male accomplices 
could rob her home.61 
Anne Henry (Louisiana, 1942, white) was from a prominent 
family, but she did not tread the path expected of her; she be-
came a prostitute. She and a male companion committed armed 
robbery in order to raise capital for a bank robbery. She forced 
the robbery victim, whom they accosted on a road, to strip na-
ked, then shot him as he begged, on his knees, for his life. Her 
male accomplice merely stood by.62 
Seven of the women killed in the course of serious felonies 
other than robbery, or to avoid lawful arrest. Like the armed 
57. See generally State v. Thompson, 224 N.C. 661, 32 S.E.2d 24 (1944). 
58. People v. Fowler, 133 N.Y. Cases & Briefs on Appeal 57, 58 (1944) (opening 
statement of prosecutor). 
59. [d. at 61. 
60. See generally Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A.2d 43 (1946). 
61. See generally People v. Santo, 43 Cal. 2d 319, 273 P.2d 249 (1954). 
62. See generally State v. Henry, 200 La. 875, 9 So. 2d 215 (1942); 196 La. 217, 198 
So. 910 (1940). 
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robber group described above, each of these women was por-
trayed at her trial and in contemporary press coverage as an ag-
gressive, . criminal self-starter, deliberately taking life to reap 
gain or advantage. 
Two were career criminals. Eva Coo (New York, 1935, 
white, forty-one) was a madam with an establishment in upstate 
New York. She and one of her prostitutes bludgeoned her re-
tarded handyman, then ran over his body with a car. Her object 
was to collect on an insurance policy of which she was the 
beneficiary.63 
Eithel "the Duchess" Spinelli (California, 1941, white, fifty-
two) and her common law husband led a small-time gang; she 
ordered the death of a youthful gang member who was thought 
to be ready to inform on the gang to the police.6• 
Eva Dugan (Arizona, 1930, white, forty-nine) and Anna 
Marie Hahn (Ohio, 1938, white) victimized lonely older men. 
They were drifters. Dugan appeared in her victim's town, and 
became the farm housekeeper of the considerably older man. 
She was convicted of killing him after his body, skull fractured, 
63. I am indebted to Watt Espy, supra note 51, for information about the Eva Coo 
case. 
64. See generally People v. Ives, 17 Cal. 2d 459, 110 P.2d 408 (1941). Clinton Duffy 
was warden of San Quentin at the time of Spinelli's execution. A lifelong opponent of the 
death penalty, Duffy wrote a memoir about the executions he witnessed at San Quentin 
during his service there. C. DUFFY, supra note 1. He unfailingly offered compassion to the 
death row inmates, tempered only by his hatred of cruelty. His description of prisoner 
Spinelli suggests the profound effects of sexist stereotyping on the way women murderers 
were perceived: 
[She) was the coldest, hardest character, male or female, I 
have ever known ... a merciless gang leader called the Duch-
ess. Even though I knew ... she ·was no beauty, I was amazed 
at her utter lack of feminine appeal. At 52, she was a homely, 
scrawny, nearsighted, sharp-featured scarecrow, with thin lips, 
beady eyes, and scraggly black hair flecked with gray. It 
hardly seemed possible that even young punks with neither 
brains nor character would take orders from her. 
[d. at 134-35. 
Spinelli made only one request of Duffy on the eve of her execution: "Will it be all 
right if those pictures are strapped over my heart when I go in there? She pointed 
to ... small photos of her three children and a six-week-old grandchild." [d. at 138. 
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was found in a shallow grave. She had run away with the vic-
tim's car in the company of nineteen year old Jack, surname un-
known, who was never arrested.811 Hahn struck up an acquain-
tance with several lonely men, whom she defrauded of their 
money and poisoned with arsenic.88 
These drifter crimes seem to be patterned on an archetype; 
terrifying stories of trusting men made weak and needy by age, 
manipulated and hurt by ruthless younger women, who may, as 
in the Dugan case, further humiliate their benefactors by giving 
their favors to a virile young man. 
Louise Peete (California, 1947, white) shot in the neck, ex-
ecutioner style, a senile invalid whom she was employed to care 
for. The mu(der was part of a scheme to acquire his property. 
She had served a long prison term for a strikingly similar 
crime.87 She is described as a psychopath with a peaches and 
cream complexion, who had the power to evoke trust and loyalty 
from people who had reason to fear her.88 
Martha Jule Beck (New York, 1951, white, twenty-nine) was 
a nurse with a history of bad luck with men. She had one child 
out of wedlock in her teens, and a second by a man she married. 
She left him, pregnant, when she learned that he had never di-
vorced his wife. She met and fell in love with her future co-de-
fendant, Raymond Ferriandez, through a lonely hearts corre-
spondence club. Fernandez' occupation was defrauding women 
whom he contacted through lonely hearts clubs introductions. 
Together, they went to Albany to visit one such woman, a 
wealthy widow. They were staying at her apartment and pursu-
ing a scheme to defraud her. At their joint trial, each defendant 
accused the other of being responsible for Mrs. Fay's death. 
Beck admitted to striking her on the head with a hammer. She 
testified that she did. so at Fernandez' insistence. Fernandez 
countered that Beck struck Mrs. Fay because she was overcome 
by jealousy when she surprised the widow Fay on an amorous 
prowl. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Mrs. Fay 
died from the blow or because she was subsequently strangled 
65. See generally Dugan v. State, 36 Ariz. 36, 282 P. 481 (1929). 
66. See generally State v. Hahn, 59 Ohio App. 178, 17 N.E.2d 392 (1938). 
67. See generally People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946). 
68. C. DUFFY, supra note 61, at 131. 
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by Fernandez. Whatever the division of responsibility for the 
murder, the two absconded with a check made out to Fernandez 
by the victim. They also carried away the victim's body, which 
was placed in a trunk and buried ten days and many miles 
later.89 
Finally, there is Bonnie Brown Heady (federal, 1953, white, 
forty-one) who, with Carl Hall, kidnapped a six year old boy. 
Although Hall was the leading intelligence in this crime, and in 
his confession frequently described Heady, an alcoholic, as 
drunk during the kidnapping and murder, she was an active par-
ticipant in the kidnapping and an accomplice in the murder. She 
induced the child's school to release him to her on the pretext of 
taking him to his sick mother, drove with Hall and the boy to a 
lonely spot, then absented herself for a walk with her boxer dog 
because she "did not want ... to witness the actual murder-
ing. "70 After the murder she assisted in the clean up and in the 
transportation and disposal of the body, which was buried in her 
garden. She was sentenced for kidnapping, a capital crime in 
Missouri, although her crime clearly embraced murder as well. 
Bonnie Heady seems to have been motivated more by the desire 
to keep up her drunken party with Hall, whom she had rather 
recently met, and to enjoy his captivating society, than by the 
$600,000 ransom the pair extracted from the child's parents.71 
Nine of the executed women killed a member of their fam-
ily. Six of thes~ murders were pecuniary crimes. 
May Carey (Delaware, 1935, white, fifty-two), a grand-
mother at the time of her death, was executed for killing her 
brother to collect her share of his modest estate. Carey, with two 
of her sons, one then a minor, beat and shot her brother. The 
jury had recommended mercy but the court sentenced May Ca-
rey and one of her sons to hang.72 
69. See generally People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302, 93 N.E.2d 859 (1950). 
70. TIME, Nov. 30, 1953, at 26. 
71. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1953, § 4, at 2, col. 4; St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 11, 
1953, at 1. 
72. I.M.H. Brandner, Legal Executions in Delaware (rev. ed. 1956) (unpublished 
University of Pennsylvania seminar paper, on file at Delaware Department of 
Corrections). 
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Dovie Dean (Ohio, 1953, white, fifty-five) became the house-
keeper of her future husband and victim. A few months after 
their wedding, she poisoned him with arsenic for the life estate 
in all his property that he willed to her as an inducement to 
marry him. Dean's crime has more in common with the drifter 
murders than a typical family murder, since the intention of 
killing her husband for gain was apparently the reason for mar-
rying him rather than a purpose that evolved after marriage was 
entered into for more conventional reasons.73 
Killing to collect insurance is a perennial theme in the fam-
ily victim cases; it was the motive in four of the 1930-67 family 
murders. 
Anna Antonio (New York, 1934, white, twenty-seven), the 
wife of a petty gangster, was executed for hiring two associates 
of her husband's to kill him. The prosecution claimed she did it 
for the insurance money. One of the supposed hirelings exoner-
ated Mrs. Antonio in a confession made an hour before his own 
execution was scheduled to take place. He revealed that the kill-
ing was motivated by bad blood between himself and the victim 
over an unpaid seventy-five dollar debt. She was nonetheless re-
fused clemency. Mrs. Antonio went to the electric chair and her 
three children went to an institution.74 
Marie Porter (Illinois, 1938, white, thirty-eight) was unable 
to convince her brother to retain her as the beneficiary of his life 
insurance policy after his marriage. To forestall the change, she 
hired her lover and his brother to kill him. The Chicago Tribune 
describes the "triggerman," Angelo; as handsome, twenty-two 
years old, and the lover of his "mentor in crime"; Porter is de-
scribed as a 250 pound mother of four daughters.711 
Rosa Stinnette (South Carolina, black, 1947) was executed 
for the insurance slaying of her husband. Little information is 
available about this case, which was never heard on appeal. 76 
73. See generally State v. Dean, 94 Ohio App. 540, 116 N.E.2d 767 (1953). 
74. People v. Antonio, 113 N.Y. Cases & Briefs on Appeal 80 (1934); see also N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 9, 1934, at 1. 
75. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 28, 1938, at 1. 
76. The State, Jan. 18, 1947, at 10 (published in Columbia, S.C.). I learned from 
Watt Espy, supra note 51, that Stinnette was executed for an insurance killing. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss3/3
1990] GENDER AND THE DEATH PENALTY 523 
Earle Dennison (Alabama, 1953, white, fifty-four), a nurse, 
poisoned her two and one-half year old niece, on whose life she 
had taken out a policy naming herself as beneficiary.77 
Three family murders were calculated and coldblooded 
crimes, although not for pecuniary gain. 
Frances Creighton's (New York, 1936, white, thirty-six) 
crime takes place against the background of Depression-era 
straightened circumstances. The Creightons, husband, wife and 
two children, took in the Appelgates and their daughter. The 
combined families evolved into a one unit living in what the 
judge who heard Creighton's appeal described as "sordid condi-
tions."7s The Creightons' fifteen year old daughter was regularly 
sleeping with Everett Appelgate, whom she wanted to marry. 
Appelgate determined to poison his tedious, grossly overweight 
wife, apparently to permit him to marry Creighton's daughter. 
Frances Creighton, who had also been sleeping with Everett Ap-
pelgate, prepared the poisoned eggnog that Everett fed to his 
wife. Evidence was presented at her trial that she had written 
anonymous letters whose purpose may have been to induce the 
Appelgates to leave her house; she had learned to dislike Mrs. 
Appelgate intensely. No clear motive for her action was estab-
lished at her trial. She claimed that she was under Applegate's 
domination because he threatened to reveal to her children that 
she and her husband had been co-defendants in an earlier 
poisoning case. The jury was unpersuaded.79 
Rhonda Bell Martin (Alabama, 1957, white, forty-eight) 
poisoned her husband so that she could marry his son.so 
Elizabeth Duncan (California, 1962, white) hired two assas-
sins to kill her son's pregnant wife. She had been vehemently 
opposed to his leaving her to get married. Her rage was relent-
less; having failed in a most persistent campaign to dissuade her 
77. See generally Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So. 2d 552 (1953). 
78. People v. Creighton, 271 N.Y. 263, 280, 2 N.E.2d 650, 658 (1936). 
79. Jd. 
80. Martin v. State, 266 Ala. 290, 96 So. 2d 298 (1957). 
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previously docile and compliant son to give up his plan to marry, 
she set about finding contract killers to remove her rival.8 } 
Sue Logue's (South Carolina, 1943, white) crime was com-
mitted not upon a family member but to avenge one, her mur-
dered husband. She and her brother-in-law hired someone to kill 
the man who had been acquitted for the murder of her hus-
band.82 Like the Martin and Duncan murders, it arose out of 
anger rather than the desire for gain, but was a coldblooded and 
deliberate crime. Likewise, Creighton's was a coldblooded mur-
der, although her motives are obscure, growing somehow out of 
the tangle of sexual intrigue and animosity in the household. 
Two women were executed for homicides that occurred in 
the wake of arguments with non-intimates. In both cases the vic-
tims were white; their killers black. 
A waiter in a Montgomery cafe told Selena Gilmore (Ala-
bama, 1930, black) she was being too noisy. She left, returned 
with a shotgun, and cornered her antagonist. She shot him while 
he kneeled before her, arms upraised in a plea for mercy. 
Gilmore said that corn whiskey had made her do it.83 Mildred 
Johnson (Mississippi, 1944, black) bludgeoned her elderly white 
landlady after an argument.8 • Gilmore and Johnson were appar-
ently guilty of wildly excessive retaliation for the slights which 
society must ask us all to bear more peaceably. These two are 
rare cases where those who could not or would not accede were 
women. 
Two women were executed for killing lovers in the heat of 
arguments. 
Lena Baker (Georgia, 1945, black, forty-four) became the 
lover of her sixty-seven year old white employer. His sons had 
hired her to care for him after he sustained a leg injury. Both 
were heavy drinkers. Baker shot her lover in the head at the 
81. See generally People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 2d 803, 350 P.2d 103, 3 Cal. Rptr. 351 
(1960). ' 
82. See generally State v. Bagwell, 201 S.C. 387, 23 S.E.2d 244 (1943). 
83. The Birmingham News (Alabama), Jan. 24, 1930. 
84. See generally Johnson v. State, 196 Miss. 402, 17 So. 2d 446 (1944). See also 
Vicksburg Evening Post (Mississippi), May 19, 1944. 
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culmination of an argument that broke out during a long drink-
ing bout. She shot him, she said, because he wouldn't let her 
leave. 811 
Betty Butler (Ohio, 1954, black, twenty-seven) was executed 
after a sensational trial for strangling and drowning her would-
be lesbian lover. Both women were black. A month before the 
homicide, Butler, the destitute young mother of two, found her-
self unable to get either ADC payments or help from her family. 
She was befriended by her victim, who offered first to pay her, 
then to keep her, in exchange for sex. The women apparently 
lived together. Butler sometimes agreed to grant Evelyn Clark 
what the Cleveland Post and Call archly refers to as an "inti-
macy," but more often she refused. They had violent quarrels. 
On the day of the killing, Butler and Clark went on an outing to 
a lake with friends; they had both been drinking. Clark made 
her last sexual demand. Betty throttled her and drowned her in 
the lake.86 
Finally, there is the case of Ethel Rosenberg (federal, 1953, 
white, thirty-five), the only one of these thirty women not re-
sponsible for the death of another human being.87 She and her 
husband Julius, American communists, were convicted of pass-
ing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Es-
pionage, however, was "worse than murder" in the eyes of the 
judge who sentenced them.88 Judge Kaufman held them respon-
sible for our Korean War dead and for putting millions more at 
risk. President Eisenhower concurred: he was unmoved by the 
worldwide campaign for clemency for Ethel as the mother of two 
small children because of the enormity of her crime.89 
The last five cases recounted break the pattern established 
by the previously discussed twenty-five, in which each defendant 
deliberately realized a plan to kill, either to reap advantage or 
destroy an enemy. All of the first twenty-five crimes are squarely 
85. Watt Espy, supra note 51, who read the trial transcript of Baker's case at the 
Randolph County courthouse, related these facts to me. 
86. Cleveland Call & Post, Mar. 14, 1953, at 1; id., June 12, 1954, at 1; id., June 19, 
1954, at 1. 
87. See generally United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 838, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952). 
88. See A. Ross, No RESPECT 17 (1989). 
89. Id. at 75. 
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within the range of deliberate and aggravated homicides which 
remain eligible for capital trials under modern era capital pun-
ishment statutes. Post-Furman death penalty statutes limit and 
enumerate the kinds of homicides which may be subject to capi-
tal processing. They typically list aggravating factors at least one 
of which must be found to be present if a death penalty is to be 
imposed.90 These modern era statutes articulate longstanding 
and traditional wisdom as to what qualities render a crime and a 
criminal eligible for capital sentencing. As such, they offer a 
guide to the values applied by juries and courts in the pre-Gregg 
era, when sentencing was not subject to elaborate statutory con-
trol. Each of the first twenty-five cases involves one or more of 
five aggravating factors which are among the most frequently in-
cluded in modern death penalty statutes, and which, when 
found to be present, most often lead to the imposition of death. 
These factors are: 1) that the murder was committed in connec-
tion with a separate violent felony (twenty-five states),91 2) that 
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain (thirty-three 
states),92 3) that the murder was done to prevent arrest (twenty-
one states),93 4) that another person was hired to do the killing 
90. Note, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and 
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1227-32 (1984) provides an analysis of how many 
times each aggravating factor appears in the statutes. Thirty-four states enumerate lists 
of factors while the three additional death penalty states, Oregon, Texas and Virginia, 
stipulate the categories of murder which may be capitally punished. A recent survey of 
the statutes found some changes but few significant trends since publication of the above 
Note. The reader will be referred to the Note for statutory citations, except where there 
have been new developments, which will be noted. Overlapping categ~ries as well as 
vague or ambiguous categories complicate the job of tallying occurrences. My interest 
throughout is in a method of identifying what Americans regard as particularly heinous 
murder rather than in the particular statutes, aggravating circumstances or frequency of 
occurrences for their own sakes. 
91. Since the publication of Note, supra note 90, the total number of statutes with 
this aggravating circumstance remains the same, although Vermont, which has since in-
stituted capital punishment, has joined the list, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(d)(3) 
(1989), and Massachusetts has been deleted, due to the invalidation of the death penalty 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Note, supra note 90, at 1230-3l. 
92. Note, supra note 90, at 1227-28. 
93. [d. at 1228. Colorado has added this factor. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6) 
(1986). 
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(eighteen states),94 5) that the murder was especially brutal, in-
human or cruel (twenty-four states).95 Four states treat use of 
poison as a means as a separate aggravating factor while others 
treat the use of poison as a circumstance which renders the 
death exceptionally crue1.96 These twenty-five cases are largely 
indistinguishable from typical cases which have garnered the 
death penalty for men. 
The last five cases, and most severely the last three, do not 
fit the typical death penalty mold of coldblooded, predatory 
crime. 
With respect to the Gilmore and Johnson in-the-wake-of-
argument murders, it is difficult to suppress entirely doubts as 
to whether contemporary perceptions of these two crimes were 
compromised by racism; both of these cases involve black on 
white violence in the old South. The Birmingham News account 
upon which I relied for information about Gilmore's crime and 
execution, indeed, was written by the victim's bereaved uncle.97 
In light of the pervasive racism of the environment in which 
these crimes took place, it is possible that the white victims of 
these crimes were not as innocent of responsibility as portrayed 
or that the black murderers were not as brutal and implacable as 
they were portrayed. 
Lena Baker and Betty Butler were poor blacks engaged in 
forbidden and reviled sexual relationships, one crossing color 
barriers in Georgia in 1944, and the other violating the prohibi-
tion against homosexuality in the 1950s. It is difficult to imagine 
a middleclass white of either sex being executed for shooting a 
lover while both were drunk. It is even more difficult to imagine 
the middle class analogue to Betty Butler's plight: Unable to get 
ADC payments or help from her family, unable either to forego 
or accept the protection of her would-be lover. 
94. Note, supra note 90, at 1229. Illinois has added this factor. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
38, para. 9-1(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1990). 
95. Note, supra note 90, at 1228-29. Three states have added this factor. ARK. STAT. 
ANN. § 5-4-604 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(d) 
(1989). 
96. Note, supra note 90, at 1229. 
97. See The Birmingham News, supra note 83. 
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Viewed against the background of the first twenty-five cases 
examined, the Ethel Rosenberg case is the most anomalous of 
all, since she killed no one - unless of course one sees her as the 
sentencing judge did: as a treasonous actor whose crime had an 
epochal effect on national security. Many, although by no means 
all, commentators argue that the Rosenbergs were martyred by 
Cold War anticommunist hysteria. Critics of the Rosenberg ex-
ecutions have argued for decades that there was little evidence 
against Julius and less against Ethel to sustain a conviction for 
espionage, and that even if the Rosenbergs were guilty of the 
espionage charged, the information passed to the Soviets as a 
result had virtually no military or strategic value.98 
The foregoing review of the 1930-62 cases points to the con-
clusion that, except where prejudices were activated that had 
nothing to do with the sex of the defendants - race prejudice, 
hostility to homosexuals, and Cold War anticommunism -
these cases offer little that distinguishes them from the similar 
cases of thousands of men who have suffered execution. In each 
of the first twenty-five cases, apart from atmospherics, e.g., the 
drifter theme or the prevalence of poison as a weapon,99 the 
women were condemned and executed for paradigmatic crimes 
of aggravated first degree murder. 
B. WOMEN DEATH SENTENCED 1978-87 
In the ten year period 1978-87, thirty-nine women have 
been sentenced to die. One has been executed. Twenty-one have 
thus far had their sentences reduced, and if the future is like the 
recent past, further sentence reductions will occur. Several of 
these women have yet to have their direct appeal to their states' 
98. R. RADOSH & J. MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE: A SEARCH FOR TRUTH (1984), pro-
vides a bibliography and commentary on the Rosenberg literature, much of which, both 
pro and con, was written from a polemic and partisan point of view. 
99. There is a popular belief that poison is a woman's weapon. There is truth in the 
perception only to this extent: women, according to SHR data, supra note 31, were re-
sponsible for a greater percentage of the total number of poisonings, 1976-87, than they 
were for any other form of murder. Men, however, were responsible for more than twice 
as many poisonings as were women. Only .2% of women murderers poisoned their vic-
tims. Handguns were the weapons most commonly employed. They were used by almost 
half the murderers of both sexes. K'nives were employed by 2.8% of the women murder-
ers and by almost 19% of the men. 
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appellate courts, where a substantial proportion of death row in-
mates have obtained sentencing relief. loo Those who do not find 
relief on direct appeal or collateral review in state courts will 
turn to the federal courts in search of relief, where, again, a sub-
stantial number of capital habeas corpus petitioners have been 
successful. lol Sentence reductions have been granted for reasons 
including appellate rulings that death was an excessive sentence, 
procedural violations and constitutional invalidation of statutes 
under which defendants were sentenced. 
The practice of execution was in decline when Furman was 
decided, and has suffered further decay in the modern capital 
punishment era. I02 Thus far in the post-Furman history of capi-
tal punishment, three percent of those on death row have suf-
fered execution. lOS If this ratio persists, few, if any, of the women 
on death row will ever be executed. For a large majority of death 
100. Forty-one percent of those whose direct appeals were decided between 1973 
and February 1988 have won sentence reduction, while an additional seven percent 
achieved sentence reduction in state collateral review. S. GROSS & R. MAURO, supra note 
30, at 220. 
101. Gross and Mauro report that 26% of petitioners obtairi relief at the district 
court level while 40% of the appeals to circuit courts have been successful. [d. 
The post-sentencing phases of the capital punishment system have been examined 
and dissected by a number of commentators who have revealed the actual achievements 
of the system. In what is perhaps the most telling image employed to invoke the death 
penalty in the modern era, Jack Greenberg likens the system to a roller coaster: 
It is a roller coaster system of capital justice, in which large 
numbers of people are constantly spilling into and out of 
death row, but virtually no actual executions take place. 
Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 926 (1982). 
One could add that it is a roller coaster in slow motion, since many years are typi-
cally passed on death row, for those who are subsequently removed, for those who even-
tually have been executed, and for those who simply stay on death row. The median time 
on death row for the more than 2,000 persons on death row at year end 1988 was three 
years and nine months. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, supra note 6, at 1. The average 
time on death row for those executed since 1977 was six years and five months. [d. at 10. 
There were 400 death row inmates who had been on death row for at least seven years. 
[d. at 12. 
102. Even prior to the 1967-76 moratorium, the number of executions conducted 
annually had been dropping off steeply, from a high of 199 in 1935 to roughly 50 per year 
by 1960. Bedau, supra note 4, at 25, table 1-3. The peak post-Gregg year for executions 
was 1987, in which only half that number of executions, 25, were performed. NAACP, 
supra note 8, at 3. All predictions of bloodbath and exponential increase in the number 
of executions once the moratorium was lifted have thus far proven incorrect. See M. 
MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1974) (history of the moratorium period). 
103. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, supra note 6, at 10. 
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sentenced offenders, the capital ritual will no longer include ac-
tual extinction, unless the ambivalence that paralyzes the sys-
tem is thrown off.lo, In light of uncertainties about sentence re-
duction and the unlikelihood of actual execution, the most 
productive way to study gender in the modern era capital pun-
ishment system may well be to focus on the characteristics of 
the crimes and the offenders which have led post-Furman courts 
to impose death sentences on women, whether or not they have 
later been extricated from death row. 
Of the thirty-nine women who were sent to death row 1978-
87, thirty-one are white, seven are black and one is Native 
American. Fewer than half, seventeen, of the thirty-seven death 
penalty states, have had women on death row in the period 
1978-87. Four were teenagers at the time they committed mur-
der, the youngest of whom was fifteen when she killed, while at 
least two were fifty or more. 
Some of these cases fall into categories which are familiar 
. from the 1930-67 cases, while others do not; in particular, in ad-
dition to the more prosaic categories of murder that women were 
sentenced for committing in an earlier era, some women were 
death sentenced in 1978-87 for sex and sadism murders and for 
mass murder. I will begin by examining the more familiar cate-
gories of killing. 
Thus far the only death sentences to survive are those im-
posed on women offenders whose degree of responsibility for 
homicide has been read to be at the same consummate level as 
was imputed to the women who died in the earlier period. In 
particular, those women who were peripherally involved in mur-
der, mere accomplices of deliberate murderers, have won sen-
tence reduction. This result is in fact required by the Supreme 
104. Greenberg, supra note 101, provides an eloquent diagnosis of American ambiv-
alence about the death penalty, as do F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 41. 
The Supreme Court has acted in recent years to curb what it perceives as abuses of 
the writ of habeas corpus by death row inmates. If those like myself who believe that 
American society is too riven about capital punishment to have much of an appetite for 
actual executions are correct, the restriction of federal habeas corpus relief will be offset 
by compensatory adjustments at other loci in the system - in prosecutors' offices, in 
trial courts and in state appellate courts. 
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Court's ruling in Enmund v. Florida. loli The Court held that the 
Coker proportionality requirement would be violated if a death 
sentence were imposed upon an accomplice who did not intend 
to take life. lo6 Women who are perceived as playing a supporting 
role in the crime of a murderous spouse have benefitted from the 
Enmund requirement, as have men in analogously peripheral 
roles. 
Nine of the women committed armed robbery murder. 
Debra Bracewell (Alabama, sentenced in 1978, white)l°7 was 
seventeen years old when she shot a grocer in the course of a 
robbery. She was newly married to Charles Bracewell, a man 
nine years her senior. Charles had a substantial criminal record. 
Bracewell easily dominated and led Debra, who, with an IQ of 
sixty-two, is mentally retarded. He drew Debra into committing 
a series of burglaries and thefts. One morning in Elba, Alabama, 
they graduated to armed robbery. Having gained admittance to 
a small grocery store before it was fully opened for business, 
Charles held a gun on the owner. Charles told Debra to take the 
owner's pistol, and then he told her to shoot him in the back of 
-the head. She shot him once and ran. Charles shot him in the 
head eight times. Charles took his wallet and fled. At her second 
trial, the mitigating factors of her age when the crime was com-
mitted, her mental retardation, and deprived background al-
lowed her to avoid a second death sentence. She was sentenced 
to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. lo8 
105. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (an accomplice who does not himself contemplate that life 
may be taken in the course of a felony may not be executed for felony murder). Enmund 
was cut back in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (permitting capital liability if 
participation in the crime is, unlike Enmund's, substantial). 
106. See infra notes 178 & 179 and accompanying text. 
107. Hereafter the date of sentence in each case will appear between the jurisdiction 
and the offender's race. 
108. See generally Bracewell v. State, 401 So. 2d 124 (Ala. Crim. App.), writ denied 
sub nom. Ex parte Bracewell, 401 So. 2d 130 (Ala.), vacated sub nom. Bracewell v. Ala-
bama, 449 U.S. 915 (1980). See Streib & Sametz, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN. 
L. REV. (1990) (forthcoming) for a more detailed account of the Bracewell case, and a 
comprehensive account of the history of the treatment of juvenile female offenders in the 
United States. I am indebted to Victor Streib for the benefit of a prepublication copy of 
his article, on which I have relied for information about the four female juveniles who 
have been on death row in the ten year period under discussion. 
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The second juvenile armed robber, Paula Cooper (Indiana, 
1986, black), has become an international cause celebre, at-
tracting appeals for clemency from, among others, Pope John 
Paul II. Paula Cooper, then fifteen years of age, and three other 
black teenage girls, gained admittance to the home of a seventy-
eight year old white widow who lived in their Gary neighbor-
hood. The girls told Mrs. Pelke that they wanted information 
about her Bible classes. Cooper was the aggressive member of 
the quartet. She pushed Mrs. Pelke to the floor, hit her on the 
head with a vase, and then stabbed her thirty-three times. The 
girls made off with ten dollars and Mrs. Pelke's car. Cooper pled 
guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to death by a judge. 
The Indiana Supreme Court has subsequently reduced her sen-
tence on the grounds of her youth.lo9 
Emma Cunningham (Georgia, 1979, white) and her hus-
band, having failed in their efforts to borrow money, went to the 
home of a man who had befriended them. Her husband attacked 
him with a large wrench. While her husband beat the victim, 
Emma went to the victim's bedroom to gather valuables. In light 
of the savagery of the beating and the circumstance that the vic-
tim was left to die, the murder was found to be aggravated by 
torture of the victim. Emma was given a new trial because evi-
dence against her was wrongfully admitted at her first trial. At 
her second trial, Emma Cunningham was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. llo 
Karla Windsor (Idaho, 1984, white) and her boyfriend ar-
rived at the home of a recent acquaintance with no money and 
109. See generally Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989). The Indiana Su-
preme Court held that, since subsequent Indiana law banned executions of persons be-
loY.' 15 when they committed the capital offense and no 15 year old offender had ever 
been executed in Indiana, the sentence was disproportionate. It also held that under 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), no 15 year old offender could be executed 
unless there was explicit statutory authorization for executing one so young. 
110. See generally Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 835, 286 S.E.2d 427 (1982); Cun-
ningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558, 284 S.E.2d 390 (1981). 
The 1978-87 women's cases which have been remanded for new trials have not, at 
least where retrials have thus far taken place, resulted in fresh death sentences. My im-
pression is that the same result is common when male defendants are retried. For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Exum of the North Carolina Supreme Court reports that of 14 cases 
remanded by his court as of March 1, 1986, only 2 or 3 have resulted in a second imposi-
tion of death. See Exum, The Death Penalty in America, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(1985). 
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no place to stay. They were seeking to raise some money to per-
mit them to go out of state to seek work. Their victim invited 
them to stay for dinner and sleep in his spare room, but refused 
to lend them his pickup truck. The pair decided to steal the 
truck, and proceeded to bind and gag the victim with duct tape. 
In a sudden rage brought on by his resistance, Windsor's boy-
friend stabbed him. Windsor and her boyfriend left in the vic-
tim's pickup with some of his valuables. The Idaho Supreme 
Court reduced Windsor's sentence because, among other factors, 
Windsor was not the actual killer.lll 
Sharon Young (Ohio, 1983, white) went to a gay bar in Cin-
cinnati with some women friends. She had been drinking that 
night and continued drinking at the bar. At closing, she accepted 
the offer of a ride from the bar owner, whose gun she had taken 
from behind the bar earlier in the evening. The gun was the only 
yield of an attempt to rob the cash register. Young shot the bar 
owner once in the back of the head, then took his car and 
money. She denied intending to shoot him, insisting that her in-
toxication was such that she could not form the intent to kill. 
She won a new trial on appeal, and at her second trial was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after 
thirty years. 112 
Each of the previous five cases included a factor - i.e., 
youth, peripheral participation in the murder, and drink -
which tended to diminish the extent to which the defendant was 
perceived as CUlpable and which eventually led to the avoidance 
of the original sentence. The next three cases lack any such 
quality. 
Doris Foster (Maryland, 1984, Native American) decided to 
rob the manager of the motel where she lived with her husband. 
Having armed herself with a screwdriver, she lured the manager 
to a vacant room with a story about unexplained noises. Her six-
teen year old daughter Liz followed her mother, who had tried 
to persuade Liz and her friend to help in the robbery. She saw 
her mother assaulting the manager from the doorway. Liz 
feigned hearing the police arrive in order to induce her mother 
111. See generally State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 964 (1986). 
112. See generally State v. Young, 40 Ohio St. 3d 704, 534 N.E.2d 842 (1988). 
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to break off the assault and leave. Doris went back to her room, 
drank some beer, took another screwdriver, and returned to the 
vacant room, again assaulting the manager, who died as a result 
of one or both of these attacks. Doris, her husband and daughter 
shared the valuables in the manager's living quarters. They then 
threw the body in a canal. The appellate court noted with disap-
proval that Foster had tried to shift blame for the murder to 
both her husband and her daughter; her conviction and sentence 
were affirmed on appeal in 1986.113 In 1987 the governor of Ma-
ryland commuted her sentence to life without possiblity of 
parole. 114 
Pamela Perillo (Texas, 1984, white) met a married couple 
named Briddle on the road, and the three began hitchhiking to-
gether. The trio were given a ride by a man named Banks. 
Banks fed them, entertained them, put them up, and hired them 
to help him move. Excited by Banks' bulging wallet, James 
Briddle proposed robbing Banks. Perillo's response was enthusi-
astic. She and James Briddle tied up Banks and a friend of his, 
Skeens, who had also come to help with the move. Perillo took 
both their wallets, and together with Briddle, pulled on a rope 
around Banks' neck until he lost consciousness. They apparently 
also killed Skeens, but the state's star witness, Briddle's now 
former wife, did not actually see Skeens murdered. Briddle and 
Perillo were tried, convicted and sentenced to die for one count 
of aggravated murder. To date, Perillo has not been able to ob-
tain sentencing relief. I IIi 
Karla Faye Tucker (Texas, 1984, white) and her boyfriend 
Danny Garrett set off in the middle of the night to intimidate, 
rob, and collect money from a man named Jerry Dean. Their 
principal objective was to steal Dean's motorcycle. Tucker and 
Garrett did steal his motorcycle, but they also brutally mur-
dered Dean and his girlfriend Deborah Thornton. Upon entering 
113. See generally Foster v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2.d'1326 (1986), denying re-
consideration of Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985). 
114. The record is bare of any information about the commutation other than that 
Foster's sentence was commuted by executive order. Personal communication with Peter 
Cobb, Office of the Governor of Maryland. 
115. See generally Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988). 
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Dean's apartment, Tucker and Garrett found Dean and Thorn-
ton asleep. Dean had, among other things strewn around his 
apartment, a partially built motorcycle and some gardening 
tools. Garrett picked up a hammer and assaulted Dean. Dean 
began to beg for his life. Tucker's response was to hit him re-
peatedly with a pickax. She later told her sister that "she got a 
'thrill' while 'picking' Dean," and that "every time she picked 
Jerry, she looked up and she grinned and got a nut and hit him 
again."116 Tucker told her sister's boyfriend that "I come with 
every stroke. "117 Danny and Karla Faye then discovered the ter-
rified Deborah Thornton in the room and began to "pick" her. lIS 
Thornton "'begged for them to kill her because she couldn't 
take anymore.' "119 The next day a friend of Dean's discovered 
the bodies, the pickax still embedded in Deborah Thornton's 
chest. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Tucker's 
conviction and sentence, and was clearly deeply appalled by this 
senseless, apparently under-motivated crime, and the admission 
that sexual gratification had overtaken any other purpose during 
repeated assaults on the victims. The appellate court found am-
ple evidence to support the jury's finding that Tucker would 
continue to pose a dangerous threat to society. The court sum-
marized evidence of her "turbulent past," her propensity to get 
into fights and her even more disturbingly unfeminine manner 
of owning to the propensity with equanimity and satisfaction. 
Tucker testified that she had been in " 'at least three good fights 
that someone was hurt.' "120 Tucker also admitted that she and 
Garrett planned to kill and plunder in the future, testifying that 
they talked of raiding drug labs. 
With the pickax murders we are in a new Clockwork Orange 
world of sadism and random violence. The themes of sadism and 
thrill seeking barely broke the surface of the 1930-62 murders. 
The 1930 Irene Schroeder case came closest, with its motifs of 
sexual license and the cult of outlawry. Schroeder, who robbed 
116. Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 526-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 3230 (1989). 
117. [d. at 527. 
118. [d. at 526. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 527. 
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people for the thrill and shot it out with lawmen, can be seen as 
a precursor to Karla Tucker. Tucker is a pradigmatic example of 
at least one type of female murderer, male-like in her aggressive-
ness, drawn to violence, under no man's domination or control. 
At the same time she is the female exemplar of the most feared 
kind of modern era violent criminal, for whom material motives 
if present are a thin coating over essentially sadistic crime.121 
The most recent and the last of the armed robbery murder 
cases brings us back from the realm of explicit sexual sadism. 
Kaysie Dudley (Florida, 1987, white) was death sentenced 
for robbing and killing her mother's former employer. Her 
mother had been the paid companion of an elderly woman. She 
was discharged several days before the murder. Dudley and her 
boyfriend Michael Sorrentino went to the victim's home to steal 
some rings. Dudley admits choking the victim with her belt, but 
claims that she left the room when her boyfriend took over the 
choking to return only after Sorrentino had cut the old woman's 
throat with a knife she had given him. Dudley's case has been 
remanded for resentencing because inadmissable ~vidence was 
admitted at trial.122 
With the exception of one case involving fraud, all the re-
maining pecuniarily motivated crimes were committed against 
family members or other intimates. 
121. Tucker appealed her sentence in part on the grounds that her drug history and 
intoxication on the night of the murders should have been considered as a mitigating 
circumstance. The jury heard extensive evidence of her drug history, but was instructed 
that it could find it mitigating only if Tucker was temporarily insane when she murdered 
Dean and Thornton. 
Tucker's drug use began at age eight: 
[d. at 533. 
she began to use marijuana at the age of eight and was already 
using heroin intravenously by age ten . . . . Her use of drugs 
was so extensive that one expert stated that she had probably 
been off drugs for only two weeks out of her entire life. During 
the two days before the killings, appellant had been taking 
Valium, Placidyl, Percodan, Soma, Wygesic, Dilaudid, and 
methamphetamine. In her own words, appellant was "wired." 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that consideration of her drug addiction 
during the penalty phase of her trial was properly limited under Texas law to the ques-
tion of whether it rendered her temporarily insane. 
122. See generally Dudley v. State, 545 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1989). 
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Dee Dyne Casteel (Florida, 1987, white) was a waitress in an 
International House of Pancakes whose manager, James Bryant, 
and owner, Art Venecia, were lovers. The Venecia/Bryant rela-
tionship deteriorated. The younger man, Bryant, was caught 
both skimming the receipts in the restaurant and in infidelity. 
Bryant approached Casteel, a woman approximately fifty years 
of age, for assistance in finding someone to kill Venecia. She was 
able to put him in touch with two men who agreed to kill 
Venecia for $5,000. After the murder, Casteel and Bryant em-
barked on a more sustained collaboration. Employing various 
forms of fraud and impersonation, they began selling off 
Venecia's possessions and financial assets. When Venecia's aged 
and moderately senile mother, who lived in a house on his prop-
erty, became less convinced of their lies about her son's wherea-
bouts, the pair took out a contract on her as well. Dee Casteel 
has yet to have her direct appeal to the Florida Supreme 
Court.123 
Fifteen women killed family members or other intimates. 
Twelve of these killed for pecuniary gain. The first four cases 
below involve the familiar family murder objective of insurance 
benefits. 
Cecilia Williamson (Mississippi, 1984, white) hired two men 
to kill her husband. He was shot in the back with a shotgun, 
after which the house was set on fire. She was to pay her accom-
plices with money from insurance proceeds. It is not clear how 
substantially she expected to profit from the murder in addition 
to obtaining the price of killing her husband. In 1987 her case 
was remanded for a new trial because her sixth amendment con-
frontation rights were violated at the first trial. Williamson has 
not returned to death row.124 
Judi Buenoano (Florida, 1985, white) was sentenced in 1985 
for the 1971 arsenic poisoning of her husband. At her trial, evi-
dence was presented that she had attempted the poisoning mur-
der of the man with whom she was living until his illness 
prompted his suspicions, suspicions that ultimately led to her 
arrest. There was also evidence that she had fatally poisoned a 
123. Personal communication with Charles Fahlbusch, Assistant District Attorney, 
Dade County, who prosecuted the case. 
124. See generally Williamson v. State, 512 So. 2d 868 (Miss. 1987). 
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second man, with whom she had lived after the death of her hus-
band. The motive for killing both men had been to collect insur-
ance benefits. In 
Lois Thacker (Indiana, 1985, white) hired a man to kill her 
husband. She drew in another man who eventually did the ac-
tual shooting by playing on his emotions. She told Matthew 
Music that her husband had killed his best friend and was in 
pursuit of Music's girlfriend. Thacker's motive was to collect on 
a substantial insurance policy on her husband's life which 
named her as beneficiary. Her case has yet to be decided on di-
rect appeal. 126 
After some unsuccessful attempts to hire a killer, Carla 
Caillier (Florida, 1987, white) persuaded her lover to kill her 
husband. Caillier wanted the insurance on her husband's life 
and the custody of her son. Her lover was sentenced to life but 
Caillier was sentenced to die, despite the jury's recommendation 
that a life sentence be imposed. The trial judge imposed death, 
making use of his power under the Florida death penalty statute 
to override a jury recommendation for a life sentence. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court reduced her sentence to life without possibil-
ity of parole for twenty-five years on the grounds that her case 
did not support the judicial override.127 
Five women murdered intimates for forms of pecuniary gain 
other than insurance. Velma Barfield murdered her fiance. 
Three victims were husbands and one was murdered by the wo-
man he kept. 
Barfield, known as "Margie," was executed in 1984, the first 
woman to be executed in the United States since the resumption 
of the practice in 1977. The last woman to be executed in the 
United States prior to Barfield had been Elizabeth Duncan in 
1962.128 
125. See generally Buenoano v. State, 527 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1988). At her trial a 
friend of the defendant's testified that "Buenoano advised her not to divorce her hus-
band, but rather told her to take out additional life insurance on his life and then poison 
him." [d. at 199. 
126. Personal communication with Mark Bates, Office of the Clerk, Indiana Su-
preme Court; Statement of the Facts, State's Appellate Brief, 
127. See generally Caillier v. State, 523 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1988). 
128. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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Velma Barfield (North Carolina, sentenced in 1978, exe-
cuted in 1984, white, fifty-two) was sentenced to die for the arse-
nic poisoning of her fiance, Stewart Taylor, a tobacco farmer. 
She admitted to poisoning three other persons, her mother and 
an elderly couple who employed her to take care of them. She 
was also suspected of poisoning her husband. Barfield poisoned 
Taylor to prevent him from learning that she had forged checks 
in his name to pay for prescription drugs. She was addicted to 
tranquilizers, and had for years engaged in devious ploys to feed 
her addiction. She built up a stock of prescriptions by consulting 
a number of doctors each of whom was unaware of her contacts 
with the others and, when pressed, forged checks to pay for the 
drugs. Stewart Taylor had threatened her with pro'secution after 
discovering that she had forged his signature. Barfield admitted 
killing him, in a panic, to prevent detection and prosecution for 
forgery, a pattern evinced in several of her admitted murders. 
The jury that sentenced her found that her crime was aggra-
vated both by its pecuniary motive and the desire to avoid the 
legal consequences of exposure.129 
Barfield's sentencing had a sequel unique among the women 
sentenced to die since 1976. So many death sentenced offenders 
regardless of sex have for so many seemingly different reasons 
been spared the exaction of their sentences. Barfield's execution 
inevitably inspires the question, why didn't her sex protect 
Barfield if nothing else could save her life? How is it possible 
that after twenty-two years without the execution of a woman, 
this fifty-two year old grandmother was strapped to a gurney 
and wheeled to her death by lethal injection in a windowless top 
floor room in Raleigh's Central Prison?130 
Margie Barfield was neither the first nor the last North Car-
olinian executed in the modern era,l31 but her execution occa-
sioned unusual interest because no woman had been executed in 
the United States for so long. In the glare of national publicity, 
her supporters, including Ruth Graham, wife of evangelist Billy 
Graham, pressed North Carolina's then Governor Jim Hunt to 
129. See generally State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. de-
nied, 448 U.S. 907, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 918 (1980). 
130. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1984, at AI. 
131. James Hutchins was executed in March 1984, and John Rook was executed in 
September 1986. NAACP, supra note 8. 
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commute her sentence.lS2 Attention was all the more riveted on 
Hunt because he was trying, in a bitterly contested election, to 
wrest a seat in the United States Senate from Jesse Helms.lss 
Hunt could only have been unpleasantly surprised when a supe-
rior court judge set a date for Barfield's execution four days 
before election day.ls4 Hunt was the champion of the progressive 
wing of the North Carolina Democratic Party. As such, his sup-
port of the death penalty, although on the record, was suspect. 
Once the execution date was set for the eve of the election, the 
born-again christian grandmother, now drug free, well adjusted 
and extraordinarily well liked, even loved, at Women's Prison, 
threatened Hunt's election chances. lSII Clemency would hurt him 
with the pro-capital punishment electorate - at least seventy 
percent were pro-capital punishment and as many as eighty per-
cent favored executing Barfield - while denying clemency 
would offend his staunchest supporters. ISO There was open spec-
ulation in the press that Hunt's decision to allow the execution 
to go forward was dictated by the urgencies of the campaign. ls7 
Either of two contradictory lessons can be drawn from the exe-
cution of Velma Barfield: It can be seen as confirmation that 
extraordinary circumstances are necessary to breach the inhibi-
tion against the state's deliberate killing of a woman. Or it can 
be seen as confirmation that in easily imaginable circumstances 
- including a pliant and politically cautious chief executive -
the inhibition, to the extent that it exists, melts away. 
LaVerne O'Bryan (Kentucky, 1980, white) poisoned her 
husband with arsenic to keep money and real estate she would 
have lost if she had divorced him. Her case was remanded for 
132. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1984, at AI, col. 1. 
133. Id., Sept. 28, 1984, at AI, col. 1. 
134. Id., Sept. 27, 1984, at AI, col. 1. 
135. To a friend [Barfield) said "The best years of my life were in 
Women's Prison." Her sincerity was testified to not only by 
the preachers who counseled her but by the guards who at-
tended her. (At Barfield's memorial service, Jenny Lancaster, 
the superintendent of Women's Prison, spoke of her profound 
grief and sense of bereavement. "I feel as if I've lost a child.") 
Reston, supra note 10, at 84. Reston also reports that matrons to assist at the execution 
had to be imported because Barfield was held in such aiftlction by her jailers at Women's 
Prison. Id. at 83. 
136. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at A16, colI. See also Reston, supra note 10, at 82. 
137. N.Y. Times, supra note 136; Reston, supra note 10. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAW-
KINS, supra note 41, at 126-28. 
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retrial due to improper admission of evidence that she had 
poisoned the man with whom she had lived prior to her marriage 
to her victim. O'Bryan has not been returned to death ro.w. 138 
Patricia Hendrickson (Arkansas, 1984, white) was tried 
twice for paying two college students $16,000 to kill her hus-
band. She was to gain over $600,000 through her husband's 
death. At her second trial she was sentenced to life.139 
Betty Lou Beets (Texas, 1985, white) shot her husband with 
a more modest object in view; she wanted to end her marriage 
but resisted divorce because she would then lose her trailer 
home. There was evidence at her trial that she killed her first 
husband as well. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reduced 
her sentence to life because there was no evidence to support the 
aggravating circumstance which led to her being sentenced to 
death. She was found to have killed "for remuneration," which 
the appellate court construed to mean murder "for hire," not 
murder "for profit."140 
Donna Sue Cox (North Carolina, 1987, white), from the ru-
ral and depressed eastern portion of North Carolina from which 
Velma Barfield hailed, was kept by a wholesale used car dealer 
in a little house in the country. She conspired with her boyfriend 
to kill the car dealer. Their object was to rob him. The victim 
was brutally beaten to death 'by Cox's boyfriend. Cox was death 
sentenced on the strength of two aggravating factors: that the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and that it 
138. See generally Q'Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S;W.2d 153 (Ky. 1982). 
139. See generally Hendrickson v. State, 290 Ark. 319, 719 S.W.2d 420 (1986), mod-
ifying Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207, 523 S.W.2d 377 (1975). 
The Hendrickson case provides an example of a female defendant attempting to 
exploit her sex to avoid the death penalty. At her second trial, a defense psychologist 
testified, although the testimony was subsequently withdrawn, that Hendrickson had a 
below average IQ, 81, and that she tended to be "a very feminine, mousy, passive, depen-
dent kind of person who would be expected to be very easily led." Hendrickson, 290 Ark. 
at 322, 719 S.W.2d at 422. No doubt such tactics have been used by other female defend-
ants. The interesting question, of course, is not whether defendants on trial for their 
lives will employ such tactics but the distinct question of whether, and how often, they 
succeed. 
140. See generally Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 3272, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 26 (1989). 
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was done for pecuniary gain. Cox has yet to be heard on direct 
appeal. 141 
Three insurance motivated murders of intimates that drew 
death sentences were committed on victims other than 
husbands. 
Mary Lou Anderson (Texas, 1978, white) and her accom-
plice John Granger were death sentenced for murdering her fa-
ther. At trial, Anderson cast the lion's share of the responsibility 
on Granger. She testified that she told him that she would col-
lect a $5,000 insurance benefit if her father died, and that she 
coveted the money because she was trying to cover some bad 
checks. Subsequently, Granger decided to kill her father and 
forced her to cooperate. He forced her to accompany him in the 
car when he set out to her father's house, tying her up and leav-
ing her in the car before he entered the house. She testified that 
he threatened to kill her and her child if she defied him. Granger 
tied up her father and his wife, then shot her. father. The jury 
was apparently unpersuaded of her relative blamelessness and 
sentenced her to die. Within ten days of testifying against her 
accomplice, she was granted a new trial at which she was sen-
tenced to fifty years imprisonment.142 
Theresa Whittington (Georgia, 1982, white) graduated high 
school in May 1981 and went to work at a Starvin' Marvin Store 
in Athens, Georgia. In October, Rick Soto came into the store, 
and the two started dating. She discovered he was married but 
was mollified by Rick's assurances that he had married for 
money. By January, Rick had persuaded Theresa to shoot his 
wife so that the two could enjoy both each other and the insur-
ance on his wife's life. Theresa made a statement that was ad-
mitted into evidence at her trial which gave the history of her 
relationship with Rick and explained why she agreed to shoot 
Cheryl Soto. "He said that if I loved him, I would do it. "l.3 
141. Personal communication with Staples Hughes, Assistant Public Defender, 
Office of the North Carolina Appellate Defender. Cox's case was prosecuted by Joe 
Freeman Britt, the same district attorney who prosecuted Velma Barfield. 
142. See generally Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985). 
143. Here, more amply, is what Rick said to Theresa, according to her statement, 
"Rick said I would have·to be the one that did it. He said that if I loved him, I would do 
it. That same day, he showed me how to shoot the gun. He told me he didn't know if he 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss3/3
1990] GENDER AND THE DEATH PENALTY 543 
When Rick was absent by prearrangement, Theresa went to the 
Soto home, shot Cheryl twice, and left her to die. The Georgia 
Supreme Court set aside Theresa's sentence on the grounds that 
other comparable murders had received life sentences. 
Rosalie Grant (Ohio, 1983, black) was sentenced to die for 
the arson murder of her two children. She was convicted of set-
ting her house on fire in order to collect the insurance. Her two 
children were asleep in the house. She has yet to be heard on 
direct appeal. 144 
Three women were· sentenced to die for killing husbands 
who were, in various ways and degrees, cruel to them. A fourth 
was sentenced to die for her cruelty to her victim, her fourteen 
year old daughter. . 
Rebecca Detter (North Carolina, 1978, white) poisoned her 
. husband, whom she accused of cruelty to herself and her chil-
dren. The report of her appeal does not convey what form 
Detter's husband's cruelty took. The jury that sentenced her to 
die was apparently not greatly moved by her accusations. The 
jury considered the murder heinous, atrocious and cruel because 
of the agonizing nature of death by arsenic poisoning, and there-
fore deserving of the death penalty. Her sentence was reduced to 
life imprisonment on the grounds that death was an impermissi-
ble ex post facto punishment in her case: The North Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the death penalty was not in effect for 
the period in which Detter's crime was committed. HI! 
Shirley Tyler (Georgia, 1979, black) poisoned her husband 
because he had abused her and her children. In 1986 the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Tyler had ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of her trial. 
The circuit court held that counsel should have presented evi-
dence that Tyler's· husband, who had once knocked out her 
teeth, was abusive, as well as evidence that she had no prior 
could pull the trigger. That was why I had to do it." Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 
169, 313 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1984). 
144. Personal communication with Adele Shank, Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, 
who is representing Rosalie Grant on appeal. According to Shank, Grant denies having 
set the fire that killed her two children. 
145. See generally State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979). 
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criminal record, had provided for her family, and had a good 
reputation as a wife and mother,146 Shirley Tyler was resen-
tenced and is now serving a life term.147 
Gaile Owens (Tennessee, 1986, white) paid a man $17,000 to 
shoot her husband. She invoked her husband's mental cruelty to 
explain her actions: "We've just had a bad marriage over the 
years, and I just felt like he had mentally, I just felt he had been 
cruel to me. There was very little physical violence.lIl·s Gaile 
Owens was denied sentencing relief when her case came up on 
direct appeal in 1988, and remains on death row. 
Judy Lane Houston (Mississippi, 1985, white) was sen-
tenced to die for murder while engaged in felonious child abuse 
of her fourteen year old daughter Paula. Houston and Paula, a 
petite teenager, got into an argument one morning while her 
daughter was dressing for school. In the course of the argument, 
Houston choked Paula with a macrame belt. Although there was 
no intent to do severe or life threatening damage, Houston 
choked the life out of her. Finding her daughter to be dead, 
Houston smuggled the body out of the house and dumped it into 
a river. At trial, evidence of episodes of abuse spanning seven 
years was admitted. Evidence was heard of welts inflicted with a 
belt buckle and of lasting damage to one eye in such a beating. 
Paula had been a straight A student scheduled to graduate from 
grammar school with multiple honors. Until her mother ended 
her life, Paula had apparently found resources that allowed her 
to at least partially compensate for the defects of her home envi-
ronment. The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the case for 
a new trial in part because the evidence of seven years of child 
abuse was held to be irrelevant and prejudicial t~ Houston.149 
146. See generally Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119,274 S.E.2d 549, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
882, reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1093 (1981), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Tyler v. Kemp, 
755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 154 (11th Cir. 1985). 
147. Personal communication with Georgia Department of Corrections. 
148. See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 
1017 (1988). 
149. See generally Houston v. State, 531 So. 2d 598 (Miss. 1988). Although the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court reversed Houston's conviction and sentence, it has affirmed two 
other capital child abuse murder cases, in Monk v. State, 532 So. 2d 592 (Miss. 1988) and 
Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1987). Part III below discusses the issue of capital 
child abuse murder. 
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Two women murdered for revenge. 
Attina Cannaday (Mississippi, 1982, white) stabbed her for-
mer lover to death in circumstances that qualify her case for the 
sex and sadism murders to be considered below. Cannaday was 
sixteen at the time of her crime, with a horrendous personal his-
tory, including rape by her father and stepfather. She was di-
vorced at age fourteen, and had been both a stripper and a pros-
titute. She was additionally handicapped by an IQ of seventy-
one. Cannaday had lived for a time with an army sergeant 
named Wojcik. When Wojcik learned Cannaday was only six-
teen, he broke off the relationship out of fear that his superiors 
would discover he was living with a minor. Wojcik soon filled the 
void, and Cannaday was jealous of his new lover, Sandra 
Sowash. Cannaday went with two friends, twenty-eight year old 
David Gray and fifteen year old Dawn Bushart, to the apart-
ment of her former lover. The three found Wojcik in bed with 
Sowash. They carried off the couple in Wojcik's van. While Can-
naday drove, Gray raped Sowash at knifepoint in the back of the 
van. When the van stopped, Sowash escaped, but Wojcik was 
beaten by Gray and stabbed nineteen times in the upper body 
by Cannaday. The Mississippi Supreme Court threw out the 
death sentence in part because of Cannaday's age. She is now 
serving a life term.lllO . 
Lois Nadean Smith (Oklahoma, 1982, white) was sentenced 
to die for a bizarre revenge slaying. The victim was her son 
Greg's former girlfriend, who had apparently threatened to kill 
Greg. Smith, Greg, and his new girlfriend, Teresa Baker, ab-
ducted Cindy Baillee and drove her to Greg's "father's house. 
While in the car Smith began her verbal assault on Baillee, and 
stabbed her in the throat. When they arrived at their destina-
tion, Greg's father and others were threatened and warned not 
to interfere. Baillee was forced to sit in a reclining chair, and 
was taunted with a pistol by the wild and exultant mother, who 
shot her at point blank range five times in the chest and twice in 
the head. Like Elizabeth Duncan's contract slaying of her son's 
pregnant wife,1II1 this murder invites psychoanalytic speculation 
150. See generally Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1221 (1985). 
151. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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about the etiology of Smith's maternal rage. Smith remains on 
death row.lli2 
Two women have been sentenced to die for killing persons 
who receive the special protection of modern era death penalty 
statutes, policemen and corrections employees. 
Michelle Binsz (Oklahoma, 1979, white) killed a department 
of corrections employee. Her conviction and sentence was re-
versed and her case remanded for a new trial for denial of due 
process in her first trial. She has not returned to death row. lli3 
Andrea Jackson (Florida, 1984, black) was arrested for filing 
a false report alleging that her car had been vandalized. Neigh-
bors told police that Jackson had in fact destroyed her own car. 
She was placed under arrest, which she resisted, and forcibly put 
in a patrol car. Once in the back of the patrol car, she feigned 
searching the floor of the car for her lost keys. When the arrest-
ing officer seated beside her bent to assist with the search, she 
shot him six times, four times in the head, and fled. Andrea 
Jackson remains on death row. Iii' 
152. See generally Smith v. State, 727 P.2d 1366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 483 U.S. 1033, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1044 (1987). 
153. See generally Binsz v. State, 675 P.2d 448 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). 
154. See generally Jackson v. State, 498 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 483 
U.S. 1010, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
There are two gender motifs in the Jackson case that are perhaps worth noting. 1) 
After the shooting she went to the home of a friend, whom she told that she had shot the 
officer because she" 'wasn't going back to jail' and she didn't like men touching her." [d. 
at 409. There had been a rough physical exchange between Jackson and the officer when 
she resisted arrest. It is possible that Jackson's lethal outburst was triggered by the resi-
due of whatever experiences had made her dislike men touching her. 2) In her unsuccess-
ful appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Jackson protested a statement at her trial by 
the prosecutor to the effect that the sex of the defendant should not influence the jurors' 
decision. She argued that under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1977), she was entitled to 
submit any mitigating factor, including her gender, to the jury. Jackson, 498 So. 2d at 
412. The Florida Supreme Court took the occasion to correct her reading of Lockett. 
Lockett, it held, requires that 
any aspect of a defendant's charat;ter or record be considered 
in mitigation. Appellant's sex sheds light on neither. In fact, as 
we stated in State v. Dixon, "Review by this Court guarantees 
that the reasons present in one case will reach a similar result 
to that reached under similar circumstances in another case. 
No longer will one man die and another live on the basis of 
race, or a woman live and a man die on the basis of sex." 
Jackson, 498 So. 2d at 412 (quoting Dixon v. State. 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973) (emphasis 
added in Jackson)). 
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Two women were sentenced to die for killing in the course 
of quarrels with bare acquaintances. 
Patricia Ann Thomas Jackson (Alabama, 1981, black) had a 
drinking problem. She got into an argument with a woman from 
whom she was trying to buy whiskey. Bonnie Walker at first 
agreed to the sale, then changed her mind. Jackson was the chief 
belligerent; her antagonist futilely sought to bring the encounter 
to an uneventful close. Jackson stabbed her in the chest with a 
knife. Jackson was herself impaled on an Alabama statute that 
makes a prior conviction for a first or second degree murder an 
aggravating factor. She had a previous second degree murder 
conviction.1I111 
Sheila Summers (Nevada, 1983, white) became involved -
her degree of involvement was never convincingly established -
in a quarrel between her friend Joan Mack and Mack's best 
friend Joy Spinney. Summers claimed to have met Spinney only 
once previous to the night of her death. At her trial, Summers 
testified that on that night, Mack phoned her and asked her to 
come to her trailer, where Mack and Spinney had been drinking 
heavily. Summers claimed that Spinney was dead when she ar-
rived. Mack explained that she had shot Spinney because she 
had criticized or interfered in her relationship with a boyfriend. 
But a police informant fitted with a concealed recording device 
taped an admission by Summers, while drunk and high on 
drugs, that she had shot Spinney, whom she believed to be al-
ready mortally wounded., In her taped admission Summers 
claims to have shot the victim to put her out of her misery. A 
suicide note written in jail by Mack also accused Summers. The 
case was remanded for retrial because the note was wrongfully 
admitted into evidence. Summers has not returned to death 
row.lliS 
Five women were sentenced to die for murders committed 
with male accomplices on other women or on female children in 
connection with the rape, sexual abuse and torture of the vic-
tims. This kind of murder is unknown in the 1930-62 cases. 
155. See generally Jackson v. State, 501 So. 2d 542 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987). 
156. See generally Summers v. State, 102 Nev. 195, 718 P.2d 676 (1986). 
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Annette Stebbing (Maryland, 1981, white) was at the time 
of her sentencing nineteen years of age. She is mildly retarded. 
She is married to her accomplice, a man nineteen years her sen-
ior. Her husband Bernard lusted after his step-niece, Dena. One 
night the Stebbings offered Dena a lift in their van. Bernard de-
cided to rape Dena. Acting willingly and apparently happily on 
his instructions, the 155 pound Annette sat on the slender and 
petite Dena while Stebbing raped and sodomized her in the back 
of the van. Annette then strangled the victim at Bernard's re-
quest. Annette Stebbing's death sentence was affirmed in 
1984.lI!7 In 1985 her sentence was modifed to life imprisonment 
by order of the judge who had tried the case. IllS 
Janice Buttrum (Georgia, 1981, white) was seventeen when 
she and her husband raped and murdered nineteen year old 
Demetra Parker. Buttrum had been married at fifteen toa 
mildly retarded man eleven years her senior. At the time of the 
murder, she was the mother of a toddler and pregnant with her 
second daughter. The victim was staying at the same motel 
where the Buttrums were living, and had become a friend. One 
afternoon the Buttrums came to Demetra's room on a pretext of 
concern about their child being ill, whereupon Danny, Janice's 
husband, raped and beat the victim, with Janice's avid assis-
tance and participation in s~xual abuse. The Buttrums then 
stabbed Demetra to death. Ninety-seven stab wounds iIiflicted 
with a penknife were identified on the horribly mutilated body 
of the pretty nineteen year old victim. The Buttrums stole some 
of the dead girl's possessions and took off in her car. Buttrum 
remains on death row, the only one of the four juvenile offenders 
in the 1978-87 cases who has not escaped death row because of 
her age at the time of the offense. llle 
Marie Moore (New Jersey, 1984, white) was a woman of 
about thirty-five when she and a teenage accomplice horribly 
tortured, abused and finally killed twelve year old Theresa 
Feury. Her death put an end to an ordeal of more than a year's 
157. Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984). 
158. By order of J. Close, Harford County Circuit Court, docket no. 7681. Personal 
communication with the Office of the Clerk, Harford County Court. 
159. See generally Buttrum v. State, 249 Ga. 652, 293 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1156, reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983), habeas corpus granted in part 
sub nom. Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
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duration. Marie Moore was living with her twelve year old 
daughter and a fifty year old friend named Mary Gardullo. In 
the summer of 1981, her home became a second home to three 
under-supervised children roughly her daughter's age. Marie 
took them on beach and bowling alley outings, and gave them an 
exciting and enjoyable summer. In September she began to fake 
phone calls from the singer, Billy Joel, who she said was her ex-
husband. Billy required that certain punishments be inflicted on 
the visitor children and Mary. Fourteen year old Ricky Flores 
became Moore and Billy's agent in inflicting the punishments. 
The punishments escalated in ferocity over the course of a year, 
during which time Billy began to speak through Moore without 
the aid of a telephone. He decided that Ricky was to become 
Moore's lover. As the punishments escalated from beatings to 
painful'and prolonged torture and sexual abuse, one by one the 
victims made their escape from the household. The lone victim 
left to take Moore's and Flores' full fury was Theresa. Theresa 
had become a full-time 'inmate in the Moore household after 
some ineffectual inquiries about her whereabouts were aban-
doned by the grandmother with whom she had lived. She en-
dured a regimen of beatings, sexual abuse, cigarette lighter 
burnings, and being painfully harnessed by day to a kitchen wall 
and confined in the bathtub at night. One day while Flores was 
untying her to transfer her from one place of torture to another, 
she hit her head on the bathtub and then a tile floor. She did 
not regain consciousness. Flores and Moore allowed her to die 
and then hid her corpse. At her trial Moore brought forward evi-
dence that she suffered from a multiple personality disorder. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded Moore's case for a 
new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not support the 
jury's finding that she killed Theresa by her own conduct. Marie 
Moore has not returned to death row.160 
We come now to two women whose crim~s, terrible crimes, 
were committed at the behest of husbands who completely dom-
inated them. The parallels in the lives and marital histories of 
the two killers are so striking that after a brief description of 
their crimes, the two cases will be discussed in tandem.161 
160. See generally State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). 
161. For information on Debra Brown's case I have relied on the "Statement of the 
Facts" section of the state's brief filed with the Indiana Supreme Court and the defend-
ant's brief filed at the Ohio Court of Appeals, which were supplied respectively by the 
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Debra Brown (Ohio, 1985, black) is on death row in Ohio 
but is under sentence of death in both Indiana and Ohio. Debra 
Brown and her husband, Alton Coleman, received multiple 
death sentences for killing three black female children and ado-
lescents. More information is available about the killing of 
Tamika Turks, aged six, in Gary, than the other crimes, because 
a child who was abducted along with Tamika survived the at-
tack. Annie Hilliard, aged nine, and Tamika were approached by 
Brown and Coleman, who offered to give them some clothes if 
the children accompanied them. Coleman fell back, so that the 
children would be seen to walk with Brown, and the children 
were taken to some woods. Annie testified that Coleman beat 
Tamika because she started to cry. Brown held Tamika to facili-
tate the beating, then the pair threw her body in the weeds. 
Coleman threatened to kill Annie also if she resisted. Annie was 
forced to provide oral sex for man and wife, then Coleman raped 
her. Tamika, who had been left for dead, started to moan. 
Brown then went and killed Tamika, after which Brown and 
Coleman choked Annie with their belts and left her unconscious 
and presumed dead. She awoke and was able to walk out of the 
woods to find help. 
Judith Neelley (Alabama, 1983, white) lured first a thirteen-
year-old, then a young woman, to motels so that her husband 
Alvin could have sex with them. In each case the victims were ' 
held prisoner for a time, then killed by Judy Neelley on Alvin's 
instructions. Thirteen year old Lisa Ann Millican was injected 
by Neelley with Drano prior to being taken away and shot be-
cause Alvin believed it would make her docile and easy to kill. 
Each of the women was young and inexperienced - Debra 
Brown was a borderline mentally retarded drop-out whose first 
paid employment was the forty-five cents an hour she made in 
the prison laundry after her incarceration. Judy Neelley was 
persuaded by Alvin to give up high school to marry him, then 
promptly taken away from her family and familiar surroundings. 
Office of the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court and Brown's attorneys for her Ohio 
appeal. For Judith Neelley's case, see generally Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Ex parte Neelley, 494 So. 2d 697 (Ala. 1986), cert. 
denied 480 U.S. 926 (1987). I also relied on her brief filed in support of petition for writ 
of certiori to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which was sent to me by her attor-
. ney, Robert French, of Fort Payne, Alabama. 
50
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss3/3
1990] GENDER AND THE DEATH PENALTY 551 
Each came from deprived backgrounds. Each of their husbands, 
according to the testimony of former wives, had a marriage be-
hind him in which he had been a vicious and compulsive wife 
beater. The ex-wives testified to having been virtual prisoners of 
their husbands. They testified that their husbands had been mo-
tivated in part by powerful but unfounded fears that their wives 
were interested in other men. Brown and Neelley each began by 
taking the blame for the murders entirely on themselves, but 
were weaned away from this protectiveness in the course of their 
legal proceedings. Each now asserts domination in an effort to 
mitigate or avoid blame and punishment. 
Judy Neelley has apparently come further in the process of 
acknowledging herself to be a battered wife who was used and 
manipulated by her husband than has Debra Brown. Although 
Brown asserts in her appeal that she participated in the crimes 
solely out of fear of Alton Coleman and to prove that she loved 
him, Debra may still believe, as she did at the time of her trial, 
that Alton's brutal love is the only valuable thing in her life. The 
manipulative Coleman persuaded her to play the evil woman in 
her testimony at his trial. Judy Neelley took the step at her ap-
peal of attempting to mount a battered wife defense. She as-
serted that she had lost the capacity for independent action and 
judgment through ferocious bouts of abuse and humiliation and 
through fear of her husband. The Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals rebuked her efforts to stretch the nascent and embat-
tled battered wife defense to cover killing another at the behest 
of the battering husband. 
The last two cases in the set are those of women who were 
sentenced for what are sometimes termed mass murders, the 
killing of three or more persons within a brief compass of 
time. 162 Such crimes are unknown among the executed women in 
the 1930-1962 cases. 
Priscilla Ford (Nevada, 1982, black) deliberately drove her 
car up onto a downtown Reno sidewalk into a throng of 
Thanksgiving holiday shoppers, killing six people and injuring 
over a score more. The fifty-one year old woman had returned to 
162. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(12) (1982), which so defines mass mur-
der, which in Tennessee is an aggravating factor that may warrant imposition of capital 
punishment. 
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Reno after an absence of seven years. Seven years before the 
massacre she had been employed at a private Reno rest home. A 
dispute with her employer had led to her arrest for trespassing, 
and her arrest had led to the placement of her daughter in a 
juvenile detention center. Ford was never reunited with the 
child. 18s She avenged herself by turning her automobile on the 
holiday crowd.184 
Lafonda Fay Foster (Kentucky, 1987, white) was a twenty-
two year old drug addicted prostitute when she and her lover, 
Tina Powell, killed five people. Both the victims and the killers 
were intoxicated on drink or drugs or both when the murders 
took place. Fay Foster occasionally made money by caring for an 
elderly man, Carlos Kearns, who paid her for giving him baths 
and performing household services. When Foster and Powell 
went to Kearns' Lexington apartment on the night of the 
murders, they found Kearns, his alcoholic wife, and three friends 
drinking heavily. Later that night the two killers and the five 
163. Reno Evening Gazette, Nov. 28, 1980, at 3, col. 1. 
164. See generally Ford v. State, 102 Nev. 126, 717 P.2d 27 (1986), post-conviction 
relief dismissed, 784 P.2d 951 (Nev. 1989). 
The Ford case provoked the Nevada Supreme Court to chastise the handling of the 
case below in a remarkable footnote: 
Notwithstanding our disposition of this appeal, we do not per-
ceive this case to be among the brightest stars in the judicial 
firmament. The senseless nature of Mrs. Ford's conduct, cou-
pled with her troubled and poignant history as wife and 
mother, lead us to conclude that the better course would have 
been a negotiated resolution assuring society of the defend-
ant's permanent sequestration. Such a resolution would have 
been just considering the ambivalent nuances of her mental 
condition and the unrelenting obsession of a mother deprived 
of her child that haunted her life for many years prior to her. 
unfocused act of vengeance. A partial list of direct trial costs 
involving special disbursements totaled $274,494. These costs 
do not include such allocable costs as attorneys' fees attributa-
ble to the district attorney's and public defender's offices, ju-
dicial salaries, judicial support staff salaries and the prolonged 
commitment of limited physical resources and facilities. All of 
the foregoing items are substantially increased by costs inci-
dent to this appeal and will continue to increase by future ex-
penditures on such matters as determining the point at which 
Mrs. Ford will be competent to receive her decreed 
punishment. 
Ford, 102 Nev. at 138 n.8, 717 P.2d at 34 n.8. 
In personal communication, the warden of the prison where she is incarcerated has 
told me that Priscilla Ford is well adjusted, even content, with life on death row. She 
finds the solitude congenial. . 
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victims went out driving in Carlos' car. In a series of events over 
several hours all five victims were stabbed, shot and run over. 
The violence apparently erupted in the course of an argument 
among members of the macabre one car parade, although the 
circumstances remain far from clear'. Fay Foster has yet to be 
heard on direct appeal. 16Ci 
Perhaps the most interesting pamng in the modern era 
cases is that of Karla Tucker and Judy Neelley. Karla Tucker, 
as she was seen by her sentencers, is at once in the tradition of 
male-like female murderers, aggressive and self-willed, whom we 
have long been willing to capitally sentence and execute. Indeed, 
in her penalty phase testimony, as well as in her confessions, to 
friends and family after the crimes, she seems to have embraced 
the two-fisted bad girl portrait of herself that helped to put her 
on death row. Karla Tucker also takes us beyond the canon of 
pre-Furman female murderers by the explicit sadism of her 
crimes, a troubling and pervasive modern era theme. 
Judy Neelley was sentenced as someone whose character 
and crimes closely resemble Karla Tucker's. Indeed, her hus-
band Alvin insisted that she was the battering spouse and that 
the murders were her work alone. He also accused her of taking 
vicarious enjoyment from his sexual relations with their victims 
and of having sexual relations with them as well. Unlike Karla 
Tucker, Judy Neelley is combatting this portrayal of herself as a 
self-willed sadist. She seeks to represent herself rather as the 
apotheosis of female oppression. Her bid for recognition of her 
status as a battered wife as legally relevant to the determination 
of her guilt and sentence poses a problem for feminist analysis 
because it exposes the tension between efforts to claim equality 
of treatment and efforts to uncloak, name and seek redress for 
oppression. 
165. Personal communication with Neal Walker, Assistant Public Advocate, who is 
representing Foster on appeal; Appellant's Brief, Foster v. Commonwealth (No. 87-SC-
356-MR). 
Neal Walker describes Fay Foster as the victim in childhood and adolescence of the 
most extreme abuse, physical and sexual, of any defendant he has represented. He be-
lieves that Carlos Kearns and his party triggered unbearable memories of abuse at the 
hands of other older men in Foster's childhood and adolescence. 
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It is perhaps also instructive that only two of the modern 
era cases involve the violation of what is recognized as the most 
sacred and privileged duty of women - a mother's duty to pro-
tect and nurture her children.188 Rosalie Grant was sentenced for 
the insurance motivated arson murder of her children. Judy 
Houston was death sentenced for the abuse murder of her four-
teen year old daughter. Grant's sentence is probably explicable 
as an instance of the likelihood that felony murder and multiple 
homicide will be death sentenced rather than as a response to 
her relationship to her victims. The Houston case is an expres-
sion of a controversial national trend to upgrade parental child 
abuse murder to murder in the first degree. 187 Murders that take 
place in the context of family violence have to date generally not 
been amenable to capital sentencing. As a society we have been 
willing neither to hold family murderers capitally accountable -
absent pecuniary motivation - nor, for the most part, to ac-
knowledge that the Fay Fosters and their male brethren on 
death row are products of the cauldrons of family sadism in 
which they were steeped as children. 
The 1978-87 cases, like the earlier set of cases of executed 
women, lend some support to the proposition that when women 
are perceived to have done the things that are most likely to 
result in death sentences for men - notably, commit felony or 
profit-motivated murder, kill more than one victim or kill sadis-
tically - they, like men, are exposed to capital punishment.188 
III. GENDER, HOMICIDE AND THE HIERARCHY OF 
HEINOUSNESS 
Under the ancient common law of England, all felonies were 
punishable by death. Over a span of hundreds of years, it has 
proven necessary progressively to restrict the use of the capital 
166. Although men commit 25% more parental murders of children than do women, 
a higher percentage of women's murders are murders of their children - 10% for women 
versus 2% for men. SHR, supra note 31. 
167. The way in which our criminal law responds to parental murder of children is 
one of the foci of the concluding section of this essay. 
168. Gross and Mauro found that felony circumstance, stranger victim, and multiple 
victims were the three factors most likely to lead to death sentences. See S. GROSS & R. 
MAURO, supra note 30, at 45-50. Baldus, Woodworth and Pulaski found that the death 
penalty was imposed in 30% of the Georgia death eligible cases where the factor that the 
murder was vile, horrible or inhuman was present. See Baldus, supra note 36, at 1380. 
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sanction in order to align the criminal law wi.th evolving commu-
nity moral sentiment. In the twelfth century, clerics were 
granted the privilege, known as benefit of clergy, of trial in ec-
clesiastical courts, courts that did not impose the death pen-
alty.l69 Benefit of clergy, now as the privilege of being spared the 
death penalty after the pronouncement of guilt in royal courts, 
was gradually extended to all lay persons for the frank purpose 
of avoiding the liberal use of capital punishment. l7o In addition 
to being granted benefit of clergy, a convicted felon could hope 
to escape death by means of a pardon. Although both man-
slaughter and murder were punishable with death, pardons were 
more easily obtained for manslaughter than for murder, and vir-
tuaily unobtainable for crimes we have since learned to call first 
degree murder.l7l In the sixteenth century, benefit of clergy was 
denied by statute to murderers, although not to persons guilty of 
manslaughter. 172 In the nineteenth century, American statutes 
introduced the distinction between first and second degree mur-
der in order to reserve capital punishment only for those 
murders the community deemed sufficiently heinous to merit 
death. 173 
In the more recent past, this winnowing trend has contin-
ued.174 Beginning in the 1940s, the number of executions con-
summated annually in the United States began to drop precip-
itously, from a high of 199 in 1935 to below 50 in the late 1950s 
and 1960s.17I) These statistics reflect a long term trend to circum-
scribe the crimes which are subject to capital punishment and to 
replace mandatory death penalty statutes with discretionary 
169. B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, supra note 33, at 7. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 6. 
172. [d. at 8. 
173. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 
701, 703 (1937). 
The earliest such statute was enacted in Pennsylvania. It reserved first degree mur-
der for premeditated and deliberate killing, killing in the course of a serious felony, or 
killing a peace officer or public official. Not all statutory schemes classified the same 
crimes as first rather than second degree murder. See W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES, 332-34 (J. Kearney 5th ed. 1952) (comparing the Penn-
sylvania scheme with those introduced by New York and Massachusetts). 
174. In this respect the history of capital punishment in the United States parallels 
that of other western democracies, although we have not joined them in total abolition. 
See Bedau, supra note 4, at 27, table 1-4. 
175. W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE, 25-26, table 1-4 (1984). 
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sentencing procedures.176 Today, only especially egregious types 
of murder remain eligible for c~pital sentencing. 
The Supreme Court, in a series of modern era cases, has 
done little more than place the imprimatur of constitutional re-
quirement on this emergent state of affairs. It has eliminated 
vestiges· and pockets of ethico-Iegal consciousness that contra-
dict the historical trend.177 The Court has invalidated statutes 
which make capital punishment mandatory for particular 
crimes.178 In Coker v. Georgia, death was held to be a dispropor-
tionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.179 The 
Coker decision, read broadly, invalidates the death penalty for 
any nonfatal crime commmitted against an adult. In Enmund v. 
Florida, the Court limited capital liability for felony murder for 
accomplices not directly involved in murder.180 
The Court has also required that sentencing discretion be 
curtailed and channeled by statute so that death is reserved only 
for crimes that the community regards as sufficiently reprehensi-
ble to be eligible for capital punishment.181 The most common 
route taken by death penalty states in their effort to meet this 
constitutional obligation has been statutory stipulation of aggra-
vating factors.182 
176. Bedau, supra note 4, at 6-12. 
177. The Court has, however, introduced very significant innovations in the realm of 
procedure, requiring what has aptly been called "super due process" for death penalty 
cases. See Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for 
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980). But see, Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. 
CT. REV. 305 (arguing that procedural restrictions have been dismantled in subsequent 
cases). 
178. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 
325 (1976). 
179. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
Only one person is currently on death row for a nonfatal crime, the capital rape of a 
child in Mississippi. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, supra note 6, at I, table 1-4. 
From 1930, when the federal government began to keep such statistics, until 1967 
when the decade-long moratorium on executions began, murder was the most common 
crime for which persons were executed: 86% of the almost 4,000 executions were for 
murder; 12% of the executed were rapists. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. NATIONAL PRISONER 
STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1977, at 12 (1978). 
180. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See supra note 105. 
181. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). 
Whether the system in operation actually comes close enough to selecting for death 
all or only the most reprehensible murderers to be considered a success in its own terms 
remains of course a question on which abolitionists and their opponents disagree. 
182. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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Three kinds of murders are stigmatized as sufficiently hei-
nous to expose their perpetrators to the risk of capital sentenc-
ing in at least half of the thirty-four states that employ aggra-
vating factors in their capital statutory schemes: 1) predatory 
murders, 2) murders that hinder or threaten law enforcement or 
governmental operations, and 3) murders that have, for want of 
a better term, the quality of excess. 
1) To murder for gain or advantage, whether monetary or 
sexual, whether for profit or for the sake of domination its~lf, is 
the most frequently stigmatized kind of murder. Murder for pe-
cuniary gain or for hire is an aggravating factor in thirty-three 
states.183 Murder in the course of another violent felony is an 
aggravating factor in twenty-five states.18" Hiring another to 
murder is also a common aggravating factor, adopted by eigh-
teen states.185 
2) Murder in the course of resisting law enforcement or 
challenging other aspects ·of the state's majesty appears as an 
aggravating factor in most statutes. Twenty-one states make 
killing to prevent arrest or make good an escape an aggravating 
circumstance.18s Twenty-five states list killing a policeman, fire-
man or corrections employee among aggravating factors.187 To 
kill a judge or prosecutor is an aggravating circumstance in fif-
teen states.188 Fifteen states so stigmatize killing to eliminate a 
witness.189 Murdering while a prisoner is an aggravating factor in 
twenty-five states.190 Seven states make killing that interferes 
with any governmental function an aggravating factor.191 
183. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
187. See Note, supra note 90, at 1231. The tally has dropped because Massachusetts 
has left the ranks of capital punishment jurisdictions. 
188. Id. at 1232. 
189. Id. Two states have added this factor. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1990); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4) (West 1989). 
190. Note, supra note 90, at 1229-30. Four additional states have this factor. GA. 
CODE § 17-10-30(b)(9) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9) (West 1989); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:11-3(4) (West 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(d) (1989). 
191. Note, supra note 90, at 1228. 
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3) To use exceptional cruelty, to kill many, or put many at 
risk of death, or to have a violent or murderous history are fac-
tors which most death penalty states treat as aggravating cir-
cumstances. In twenty-four states exceptional cruelty' or brutal-
ity is an aggravating circumstance.192 Twelve states treat torture 
as a factor in aggravation.193 In twenty-three states a history of 
violence or a prior conviction for a violent felony is an aggravat-
ing factor!9' In twenty-three states a prior murder or capital 
conviction is an aggravating factor!911 Knowingly creating a great 
risk of harm to more than one person is aggravating in twenty-
four states!96 The use of explosives to kill is aggravating in six-
teen states.197 Fourteen states treat the killing of multiple vic-
tims as an aggravating factor.198 
Let us stop to examine the import of these patterns from a 
feminist point of view. It is striking from this perspective that 
while the capital statutes offer their special protection to repre-
sentatives of the state and to the interaction of non-intimates, 
the third of the three spheres into which society can be divided, 
family life, is notably absent from the statutes' universe of con-
cerns!99 Women's traditional interest in the sanctity of the 
192. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
193. Note, supra note 90, at 1229. Three additional states have this factor. S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i) (1982); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (1989). 
194. Note, supra note 90, at 1230. Three states have added this factor. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 16-11-103(6) (1986); IDAHO CODE § 19-25-15(g) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 
2303(d) (1989). 
195. Note, supra note 90, at 1230. Eleven states have added this factor. ALA. CODE § 
13A-5-49(2) (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) 
(West 1989); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A) (West 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2523(1) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.Q33 (Michie 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
630:4(II)(a) (1986); N.c. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.04(A) (Page 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (Purdon 1989); WYo. STAT. § 
6-2-102(h) (1988). 
196. Note, supra note 90, at 1231. 
197. Note, supra note 90, at 1229. Ten additional states have this factor. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 921.141(5) (West 1989); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.025(2)(a) (Baldwin 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2 (Vernon 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 200.033 (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-20(C)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (1988); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i) (1982); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h) (1988). 
198. Note, supra note 90, at 1232. Four states have added this factor. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4(II)(a) (1986); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Page 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(d) (1989). 
199. Hegel makes this tripartite division of ethical life. See G. HEGEL. PHILOSOPHY 
OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1952). 
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home, its peace and safety, is not supported by the prestige that 
would be symbolically conveyed by the attachment of the capital 
sanction to the most egregious family homicides. Of course, if a 
family murder has a pecuniary motive, the alchemy of money 
transmutes it into a killing as heinous as one committed on a 
stranger. And capital statutes do reflect the opprobrium with 
which rape and other sexual offense killings, whose victims are 
far more likely to be women or children than adult men, are re-
garded.20o These provisions, although they might also apply to 
crimes against family victims, reflect the extreme disapprobation 
which our society reserves for crimes inflicted on other men's 
women and children. 
Capital punishment, then, is used primarily to reinforce and 
solemnize the code of conduct governing relations among per-
sons who do not warm themselves at the same hearth; the sanc-
tion is largely reserved for predatory murder, the kind of crime 
men (and women) fear that male strangers will inflict upon 
themselves and their families. 201 
Our law of homicide reveals a moral outlook in which 
greater opprobrium normally attaches to the killing of strangers 
than to the killing of intimates. This hierarchy of opprobrium is 
chivalrous to women as perpetrators, since such a high percent-
age of the homicides women commit are domestic; but it is not 
chivalrous to women as victims, since the blameworthiness of 
domestic homicide is discounted relative to stranger killing.202 
200. Recently there has been a movement to include child sexual abuse murder 
among the types of felony murder that can sustain a death penalty. As of December 
1988, 13 states had amended their felony murder statutes so that the underlying felony 
may be child sexual abuse. J. REPELLA, PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE DEATHS-STATU-
TORY FRAMEWORK 2 (available from National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse, 
1033 North Fairfax St., Alexandria, Va. 22314). New Mexico and Montana have made 
child sexual abuse a factor in aggravation of homicide. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5.B 
(1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302(9) (1989). There have also been recent statutory 
innovations which seek to enhance the protection of children from nonsexual assault. See 
infra note 203. 
201. Stranger murders comprise less than one-fifth of all murders. The largest num-
ber of murders are of the acquaintance type, where victim and killer are neither stran-
gers nor intimates. Ninety-six percent of all stranger murderers are males as are four-
fifths of their victims, according to SHR data. See supra note 31. 
202. In 1988, 31 % of female murder victims were slain by their husbands or boy-
friends, while 5% of male victims were killed by wives or girlfriends. See FEDERAL Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 1988, at 13 (1989) 
[hereinafter UCR). 
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The hierarchy is remarkably indifferent to the substantial num-
ber of child victims who perish at the hands of their parents and 
other caretakers each year, and therefore also unresponsive to 
the traditional concern of women for the safety and welfare of 
children.203 No state has enumerated spousal victims among 
those under the explicit protection of the capital sanction. None-
theless, it is certainly conceptually possible to regard the be-
trayal of the trust and special obligations that reside in family 
relationships as at least as heinous as predatory stranger mur-
der. The vulnerability of typical victims of family murder, bred 
by weakness or dependency, could be viewed as an aggravating 
factor rendering such homicides eligible for capital sentencing. 
But such is not the tenor of the law. 
One can imagine a critique of modern era capital punish-
ment law, issuing, let us say, from feminists of a spartan temper, 
who were not out of sympathy with the death penalty per se, 
along the following lines: One purpose of the death penalty in 
modern era criminal law is to make it possible for society ade-
quately to express the extent of its condemnation of the worst 
crimes, and thereby also teach and reaffirm the moral grading of 
offenses that informs the criminal law. Current law holds it to be 
more heinous to kill for gain than to kill a spouse or child in 
anger. From a feminist point of view, the privileging of robbery 
murder but not domestic murder as among the most serious 
homicides expresses the male orientation of the law of homicide. 
We propose that serious and habitual family abuse be elevated 
by statute to the status of a felony capable of sustaining a death 
sentence. To do so would bring the criminal law into alignment 
with emerging awareness of the gravity and magnitude of the 
problem of family violence. We are well aware that the death 
203. Two states, however, have recently amended their statutes to include child 
abuse among the felony circumstances that render a homicide eligible for capital sen-
tencing. MISS. CODE ANN § 99-19-1Ol(5)(d) (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(10(d) 
(1989). Five states make the murder of a child an aggravating factor, regardless of the 
nature of the homicide. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. 11 38 
9-1(b)(7); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(1O) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(9) (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(1). Delaware treats murdering any de-
fenseless victim as an aggravating circumstance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(s) 
(1989). Seven states, both capital punishment and noncapital punishment states, have 
elevated child abuse homicide to first degree murder. See J. REPELLA, supra note 200, at 
3. 
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penalty is rarely imposed in our society. If, however, it is none-
theless symbolically important to retain the death penalty to 
stigmatize and occasionally execute those who prey on strangers 
it should be no less important to so stigmatize family murderers. 
Our purpose is to integrate women's value orientation into 
the law 'of homicide. The proposal certainly does not favor 
women offenders. Female murderers of spouses and children 
would face capital trials more frequently than they do under the 
current capital regime. Nonetheless, it must be said that the 
lack of heinousness attached to family abuse murder is undoubt-
edly one symptom or effect of the traditional family privacy doc-
trine that has generally supported male domestic authority and 
tolerated male violence in the home. Indeed, there are indica-
tions that the efforts of men to exercise and defend the tradi-
tional male prerogative of supremacy in the home is the root 
cause of perhaps the majority of spousal killings regardless of 
the sex of the victim. In his classic study of spousal murder in 
Philadelphia, Marvin Wolfgang found that in the majority of 
cases of wives who killed their husbands, the husband-victims 
strongly provoked their wives to attack. 204 Wolfgang attributes 
the relative leniency of sentences given to female spousal killers 
to the prevalence of husband provocation.2OIi A more recent 
study building on Wolfgang's insights suggests that the most 
common type of murder of wives by husbands occurs in circum-
stances where the husband understands himself to be retaliating 
for his wife's desertion or infidelity.206 Recent investigations 
204. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 216-17 (1958). 
205. [d. 
206. Barnard, Vera, Vera & Newman, Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse 
Murder, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 271 (1982). 
Barnard did psychiatric evaluations of 34 spousal killers for the courts of north cen-
tral Florida, 1970-80, 11 women and 23 men. Eight of the female killers fit Wolfgang's 
description of "victim-precipitated homicide." Barnard et al. call the most common type 
of male spousal killing "sex-role threat homicide." "The men who engaged in this type of 
uxoricide felt they were reacting to a previous offense on the part of the victim ... a 
walkout, a demand, a threat of separation were taken by the men to represent intolerable 
desertion, rejection, and abandonment." [d. at 278. 
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have also revealed that a major risk factor for child abuse result-
ing in fatality is the presence of a man in the home. The belea-
guered single parent mother may be the most common perpetra-
tor of nonfatal abuse and neglect, but abusive homes become 
more deadly if a man is present.207 
There are at least three possible rejoinders to this feminist 
proposal, each one in effect an effort to explain (away) the ap-
parent male bias of the current law: 
1) The harshness of the current statutes towards predatory 
murder relative to domestic murder is legitimate; it is grounded 
in the fact that stranger killings provoke more fear of enduring 
propensity to violence towards the whole community. The per-
son who kills, e.g., his or her spouse in anger, does not thereby 
evince a propensity to violence which is likely to pose a threat to 
others in the future. The spousal killer's rage has but one poten-
tial object; unlike the person who uses violence for pecuniary 
gain, the killer's dangerousness probably dies with his or her 
victim. 
The above argument has plausibility but evinces a lack of 
appreciation of the nature of at least the most common types of 
family killings, i.e., typical spousal murders and parental child 
abuse murders.208 Although typical family murders are the prod-
ucts of sudden and transitory anger, there are two senses in 
which family violence portends future dangerousness. First, 
207. Alfaro, Studying Child Maltreatment Fatalities: A Synthesis of Nine Projects, 
in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: POLICY AND PRACTICE 219 (D. 
Besharov ed. 1988). 
Alfaro surveys the results of studies in disparate parts of the country in the 1980s; 
seven of the nine studies found that men are involved in a majority of fatality cases. He 
concludes in part, "The image of a beleaguered single-parent mother is a prominent fea-
ture in the child maltreatment literature, but this type of family is in the minority 
among the families in most of the fatality studies. . . . These studies tend to point to a 
greater role for men (fathers of the child or boyfriends of the mother) in fatality cases, in 
contrast to non-fatal cases in which the mother alone is often found responsible for the 
abuse and neglect." Id. at 231-32. See also C. JACQUOT & D. ROBERTS, FATAL CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT IN OREGON 1985 AND 1986 (FEB. 1988) (report published by Child Protec-
tive Services Section, Oregon Children's Services Division). 
208. According to 1988 UCR data, 15"lo of murder victims were killed by relatives. 
See UCR, supra note 202, at 11. But see Straus, Domestic Violence and Homicide Ante-
cedents, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 446 (1986) (arguing percentage of family murders is 
closer to 25"lo). Approximately half the family murders are spousal. Id. at 447. Child 
abuse fatalities are estimated to have exceeded one thousand per year in 1986, 1987 and 
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most family murders are preceded, if not prefigured, "by a long 
history of assaults."209 Second, it is inaccurate to distinguish be-
tween family and stranger murder on the basis that family mur-
der victims are, as it were, nonfungible while stranger victims 
are fungible. Sometimes it is true that no one else in the world is 
at risk from a particular offender once her victim is dead, e.g., 
the defensive killing of a wife beater. But often fatal family 
abuse does raise the specter of further serious injury or fatality. 
Abusive family members can present a continuing danger to 
other family members, e.g., the siblings of a child fatality. Both 
sides in the current debate between those who would use crimi-
nal prosecution more liberally in child abuse cases and those 
who argue for more therapeutic approaches acknowledge that 
protection of a child from further abuse or the protection of sib-
lings from a fatal child abuser must be the primary considera-
tion in determining how to design the societal response in severe 
cases.210 
2) There is a more plausible theory which purports to ex-
plain why we are most frightened by and punitive towards pred-
atory murder: If two acquaintances engage in a quarrel which 
turns homicidal, if two family members do the same, we are dis-
posed to regard the victim as sharing responsibility through 
provocation - whether or not the provocation is legally suffi-
cient to reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter. We 
also regard the victim as has having assumed at least a measure 
of the risk of victimization, by remaining in an intimate relation-
ship with someone who has evinced a propensity to violence. To 
the extent that we imagine the victim to have possessed a degree 
of control over the circumstances of his demise, the homicide is 
rendered less frightening, and, to the same extent, the appropri-
ate degree of punitive response is curtailed.211 
1988. See D. DARO & L. MITCHEL, CHILD ABUSE FATALITIES CONTINUE TO RISE: THE RE-
SULTS OF THE 1988 ANNUAL FIFTY STATE SURVEY 13 (Mar. 1989) (report prepared by the 
National Center on Child Abuse Prevention Research). 
209. Straus, supra note 208, at 454. 
210. See Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 315 (1987); Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Inter-
est of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1985-86). 
211. This theory is in effect a generalization of Wolfgang's concept of victim-precipi-
tated homicide. See M. WOLFGANG, supra note 204. 
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The insurmountable difficulty faced by this theory is that 
its plausibility requires that we imagine the victim to be the 
peer of the killer. The theory is utterly unable to account for the 
lesser heinousness that attaches to killing a young child. Nor can 
it account for the relative lack of heinousness ascribed to the 
murder of someone who is objectively or psychologically depen-
dent upon the killer, e.g., a battered spouse. 
3) It may also be said that the feminist critique fails to re-
spect the theory of relative culpability embedded in our law of 
homicide. We deploy the distinction between hotblooded and 
coldblooded killing to determine relative culpability. The typical 
family murder is hotblooded. Hotblood mitigates blame; cold-
blood enhances culpability. However, since the introduction of 
degrees of murder, first degree murder has always embraced, in 
addition to deliberate and premeditated murder, murder perpe-
trated in the course of certain felonies, regardless of whether the 
murder was intentional. Without deviating from established le-
gal principles, the law could offer children the same status and 
protection that it now offers to hapless 7-Eleven clerks. In addi-
tion to felony murder, some jurisdictions continue to treat de-
praved heart, or depraved mind, murder, as murder in the first 
degree capable of sustaining a death penalty.212 
I do not write to endorse the hypothetical spartan feminist 
proposal to elevate egregious cases of family abuse murder to the 
level of capital crimes. I would be more inclined to respond to 
the lack of parity between stranger and family murder by fash-
ioning a less invidious regime from which the death penalty was 
eliminated. However, the feminist proposal does call attention to 
distortions in our capital punishment regime, and more gener-
ally in our law of homicide, that reveal gender bias. Although 
family abuse murders originate in anger rather than in a preda-
tory motive, the conceptual and moral distinctions which inform 
our law of homicide pose no barriers to treating some family 
212. A depraved heart murder is committed without intent to kill but with disregard 
of the high degree of unjustifiable risk of serious injury or death to another. W. LAFAVE 
& A. SCOTI', CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4 (2d ed. 1986). 
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murders as among the most heinous forms of killing. Neither de-
liberateness nor premeditation, nor even intent to kill, is re-
quired to convict or capitally sentence for felony murder. To re-
sist the elevation of some family abuse murders to first degree 
crimes on the grounds merely that they are hotblooded, i.e., lack 
predatory motive, is to reveal the very bias about which the fem-
inist complains, that of regarding predatory stranger murder as 
inherently more reprehensible than domestic tyranny. If society 
is to use the death penalty to symbolize its most profound disap-
probation, a better reason is needed for attaching this symbol to 
the violation of the security of strangers while denying it to the 
violation of the security of intimates. Surely the reason our law 
has developed as it has in this r~gard is that men, whose per-
spective has shaped the law, have had far less reason to fear 
their intimates than have women and children, and, at the same 
time, have had an investment in supporting the privileged sepa-
rateness of the domestic sphere under male authority. It may 
well be, then, that the egregious source of gender discrimination 
in the capital punishment system lies not in the privileged treat-
ment of women murderers but in the subordination of domestic 
murder to stranger murder in our society's hierarchy of 
heinousness. 
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